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THE INSTITUTIONAL MISMATCH OF STATE CIVIL
COURTS
Colleen F. Shanahan,* Jessica K. Steinberg,** Alyx Mark*** &
Anna E. Carpenter****
State civil courts are central institutions in American democracy.
Though designed for dispute resolution, these courts function as emergency rooms for social needs in the face of the failure of the legislative and
executive branches to disrupt or mitigate inequality. We reconsider
national case data to analyze the presence of social needs in state civil
cases. We then use original data from courtroom observation and interviews to theorize how state civil courts grapple with the mismatch between
the social needs people bring to these courts and their institutional design.
This institutional mismatch leads to two roles of state civil courts that are
in tension. First, state civil courts can function as violent actors. Second,
they have become unseen, collective policymakers in our democracy. This
mismatch and the roles that result should spur us to reimagine state civil
courts as institutions. Such institutional change requires broad mobilization toward meeting people’s social needs across the branches of
government and thus rightsizing state civil courts’ democratic role.
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INTRODUCTION
Across the country, the courtroom door marked “Housing Court”
reveals a judge listening to hour after hour of people on the verge of losing
their homes because they have lost a job, had an unexpected medical
expense, cannot aﬀord childcare, have a family member engaged in the
criminal legal system, complained about the condition of their home, or
because the rent will always be too high. The litigants in housing court are
disproportionately Black, though the racial and ethnic background of
those facing the loss of their home varies across the country.1 Most of the
people facing this life-altering consequence are women,2 almost none of
whom have a lawyer, though many of their landlords do,3 and losing their
home will immediately harm their economic security, family integrity, and

1. Peter Hepburn, Renee Louis & Matthew Desmond, Racial and Gender Disparities
Among Evicted Americans, 7 Socio. Sci. 649, 653–58 (2020) (showing that “for every 100
eviction filings to white renters, . . . there were nearly 80 eviction filings to black renters”
and that the percentage of eviction filings against Black renters in the ten largest counties
studied ranged from 16.6% in Middlesex, Massachusetts to 61.3% in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania); see also Deena Greenberg, Carl Gershenson & Matthew Desmond,
Discrimination in Evictions: Empirical Evidence and Legal Challenges, 51 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 115, 120 (2016) (“Studies from diﬀerent cities have found that people of color
comprise about eighty percent of those facing evictions.”).
2. See Kathryn Sabbeth & Jessica K. Steinberg, The Gender of Gideon, 69 UCLA L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 11), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3807349
[https://perma.cc/6SGG-YN47].
3. Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 Conn. L.
Rev. 741, 750 (2015) (“In landlord-tenant matters . . . it is typical for ninety percent of
tenants to appear pro se while ninety percent of landlords appear with counsel.”).
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mental and physical health.4 The litigants in housing court do not end up
behind that door by coincidence. Rather, this is a foreseeable consequence
of the absence of aﬀordable and adequate housing, health care, childcare,
and education, the absence of fair and equal wages, and the presence of
mass incarceration in our society. State civil cases involving debt, family
relationships, and children have diﬀerent names on the courtroom door
but similar stories behind those doors. The millions of people who come
to state civil courts each year in the United States are in crisis, and so, too,
are the courts that hear their cases.
When scholars and reformers talk about this problem, we acknowledge
its overwhelming breadth and depth and then fix our gaze on a particular
group of institutional actors. We theorize their role, quantify behavior and
its impact, consider diﬀerent roles for actors, or contemplate the role of
technology instead. We might look closely at the experience of litigants,5
the dominance of certain plaintiﬀs,6 a lack of lawyers,7 judicial behavior,8
4. Emily Benfer, Health Justice: A Framework (and Call to Action) for the Elimination
of Health Inequality and Social Injustice, 65 Am. U. L. Rev. 275, 308–12 (2015)
(“[C]onsequences of eviction often include prolonged periods of homelessness, job loss,
depression, and subsequent deterioration of health.”).
5. See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination
of Poor Tenants, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 541 (1992) (“At [the] root [of the standard view of
legal institutions] is the acculturated belief that the individual is the proper unit to scrutinize
when analyzing disputes about performance under a lease agreement.”); Russell Engler,
Approaching Ethical Issues Involving Unrepresented Litigants, Clearinghouse Rev. J.
Poverty L. & Pol’y 377, 377 (2009) (approaching ethical issues by focusing first on
interactions with unrepresented adverse parties).
6. See, e.g., Kathryn Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights, 27 Geo.
J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 97, 119–28 (2019) (explaining why the private market fails to
represent tenants as plaintiﬀs); Daniel Wilf-Townsend, Assembly-Line Plaintiﬀs, 135 Harv.
L. Rev. 1704, 1728–33 (2022) (examining the repeat-player plaintiﬀs behind debt collection
cases).
7. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, 41 Harv. J.L. &
Gender 55, 61 (2018) [hereinafter Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon] (arguing
that New York City legislation’s focus on defense lawyering limits the impact of appointment
of counsel); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: Understanding
Relational and Substantive Expertise Through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 Am. Soc. Rev. 909, 912–
16 (2015) (“Unrepresented litigants are common, with an average of 73 percent of the focal
parties in each study appearing without any representation, and no representation
characterizing 85 percent of the observed cases.”).
8. See Anna E. Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 647, 651–55 (2017) (examining the impact of active judging on unrepresented
litigants); Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. Shanahan, Jessica Steinberg & Alyx Mark, Judges
in Lawyerless Courts, 110 Geo. L.J. 509, 512–13 (2022) [hereinafter Carpenter et al., Judges
in Lawyerless Courts] (examining the “unfettered discretion” judges have in lawyerless
courts with unrepresented litigants); Michael C. Pollack, Courts Beyond Judging, 46 BYU L.
Rev. 719, 724, 730–58 (2021) (“State court judges engage in decisionmaking in a whole host
of non-adversarial settings outside of the traditional context of dispute resolution.”); Jessica
K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion in “Small Case” Civil
Justice, 2016 BYU L. Rev. 899, 906, 919–26 [hereinafter Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown]
(“[ J]udges are responding to an inflexible passive norm by abandoning it entirely. In some
matters, judges extensively question parties and witnesses. In others, they relax or eliminate
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the power of court staﬀ,9 or technological intervention.10 This actorfocused view of state civil courts obscures the depth of the problem. The
crisis of state civil courts is an institutional one, grounded in these courts’
role in democratic governance.11
We aim to steady our gaze with a theory of state civil courts as they are
now, using a new analysis of quantitative data and our own original
qualitative data. We begin with two key elements of state courts’
institutional context. First, the judicial branch is designed for dispute
resolution. Second, the executive and legislative branches have failed to
meet society’s social needs.12
Within this context, we use national data about the caseloads of state
civil courts to refine our understanding of what these courts do. We would
expect to see these courts resolving disputes between parties, but they do
not. Instead, we see an institutional mismatch: State civil courts are institutions where people bring their social needs more than their disputes.
The work of state civil courts is a daily manifestation of the failure of the
executive and legislative branches to disrupt structural inequality or invest
in systems of care to mitigate it.13 These courts operate in the breach to
address social needs because they cannot decline the cases presented to
them. Thus, the social needs people bring to court are framed as disputes
procedural and evidentiary rules. In still others, they raise new legal theories to fit the
parties’ facts or order relief not requested.”).
9. See, Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1987, 1988
(2005) (examining the role of the judges, mediators, and clerks in cases involving
unrepresented litigants); Jessica K. Steinberg, Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. Shanahan &
Alyx Mark, Judges and the Deregulation of the Lawyer’s Monopoly, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 1315,
1327–36 (2021) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., Judges and Deregulation] (describing judges
and their reliance on nonlawyer actors who ultimately shape facts, arguments, and
outcomes).
10. See David Freeman Engstrom & Jonah B. Gelbach, Legal Tech, Civil Procedure,
and the Future of Adversarialism, 169 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1001, 1004–05 (2021) (describing the
transformative eﬀect of “legal tech” on litigation and civil procedure); Margaret Hagan, The
User Experience of the Internet as a Legal Help Service: Defining Standards for the Next
Generation of User-Friendly Online Legal Services, 20 Va. J.L. & Tech. 394, 399–402 (2016)
(examining how the internet is currently insuﬃcient as a legal help resource and discussing
best practices for improving it as such; Tanina Rostain, Techno-Optimism & Access to the
Legal System, 148 Daedalus 93, 95 (2019) (“Self-help technologies can play a useful role in
assisting low- and moderate-income people, but they may not be the most eﬀective means
to redress power imbalances produced by income, racial, and other forms of inequality.”).
11. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development, The L. & Pol. Econ.
Project ( July 21, 2021), https://lpeproject.org/blog/market-based-law-development/
[https://perma.cc/5UQ8-BRZT] [hereinafter Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development]
(explaining how the stratification of courts aﬀects the development of law).
12. See infra note 19 and accompanying text regarding our use of “social need.”
13. See Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified Courts Can’t Solve
Inequality, 148 Daedalus 128, 129 (2019) (“The executive and legislative branches have
aggressively pared back social safety net programs, and the judicial branch is required to
hear the cases that result.”).
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in order to access social provision.14 For example, a grandmother—
seeking mental health care and stable housing for her daughter and stability for her grandchildren—may end up in domestic violence court
because framing her social need as a dispute with her daughter in need of
a protective order is a chance to access support. This leaves state civil
courts attempting to address—within the constraints of their dispute resolution design—the social needs of litigants. Though invoking
incarceration only rarely, state civil courts grapple with life-sustaining and
life-altering social needs: housing, employment, family, and economic
security.
We then use qualitative data from around the country to see how
courts grapple with this mismatch: How do courts designed for dispute
resolution face litigants’ social needs in the courtroom? The data reveal
that state civil courts are responding in four related ways to this mismatch.
First, courts avoid the social needs presented and hold tight to their
dispute resolution design. Second, courts try to provide services to meet
litigants’ social needs. Third, courts develop new, ad hoc law or procedure
to meet litigants’ social needs. Fourth, courts develop new institutions
within or adjacent to the court to meet litigants’ social needs.
State civil courts’ responses to people’s social needs are diﬀuse and
varied, yet the data allow us to theorize these courts’ actual institutional
role. Our theory captures two institutional roles that are in tension and
reflective of the dissonance of the institutional mismatch. First, the mismatch between state civil courts’ institutional design and social needs casts
these institutions as violent actors. Decades ago, Professor Robert Cover
warned us that “[w]hen [legal] interpreters have finished their work, they
frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn apart by these
organized, social practices of violence.”15 These observations originate in
criminal courts, and we extend them to civil courts and argue that the
institutional mismatch exacerbates a violent institutional role of state civil
courts. This includes government violence supplanting private violence,
such as the history of eviction matters described by Professor Shirin Sinnar.16 This violence appears when courts hew to their institutional design,
avoiding social needs but also compounding them in the context of state
control. This role includes the ways in which state civil courts intersect with
mass incarceration, specifically when civil cases can lead to incarceration
as a penalty, such as in child support or domestic violence matters. At the
same time, state civil courts attempting to meet social needs by providing
services can lead to government control and violence in the guise of these
14. We use the term social provision to capture “the range of state policies
implemented to improve general welfare.” Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social
Provision, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1093, 1096 n.2 (2019).
15. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
16. Shirin Sinnar, Civil Procedure in the Shadow of Violence, in A Guide to Civil
Procedure: Integrating Critical Legal Perspectives (Portia Pedro, Brooke Coleman, Liz
Porter & Suzette Malveaux eds.) (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at *2–*5).
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needs being met, such as in child welfare matters. It also includes the violence of the experience of appearing in state civil court.
Second, this mismatch casts state civil courts as policymaking institutions, in a distinct variation from the policymaking courts that scholars
traditionally worry about. Here, the institutional mismatch between
courts’ dispute resolution design and the social needs of litigants has led
to a diﬀuse, ad hoc, and unmeasured—but nonetheless large-scale—
response by courts. Faced with social needs, courts are attempting social
provision, either by stepping into the void left by the executive branch and
providing direct social services—such as housing resources tied to obtaining a protective order—or by behaving like legislatures by allocating
funding to programs for social provision, often going as far as building
new institutions. In addition, courts create unseen law and procedure to
facilitate these choices in ways that raise concerns about transparency and
process. These small-scale choices are repeating themselves in diﬀuse ways
across jurisdictions. Collectively, state civil courts have become a branch of
government that develops policy to grapple with social needs without the
institutional design or resources to do so.
From this analysis, we see that institutional—not just operational—
change for state civil courts is imperative, and we begin to imagine a way
forward for state civil courts as democratic institutions.17 We acknowledge
the importance of incremental, actor-focused change to meet the immediate needs of millions of litigants each year. We also see the imperative of
imagining broad, institutional change that will relieve the tension between
the social needs people bring to court and courts’ dispute resolution
design. Where we now see a social need from one litigant in a dispute, we
challenge ourselves to imagine a world where social provision is completely realized and the needs of both litigants are met.
I. WHAT STATE CIVIL COURTS DO
“This courtroom is like the emergency room.” 18
We begin with two observations about the institutional context of state
civil courts in American democracy. First, our courts are designed as sites
of dispute resolution. Second, the executive and legislative branches have
failed to avoid or mitigate inequality. Though we would expect to see state
civil courts resolving disputes, in the face of inequality, state civil courts do

17. For a diﬀerent conception of courts as democratic institutions, see Judith Resnik,
Reinventing Courts as Democratic Institutions, 143 Daedalus 9, 10 (2014) (describing courts
as “sites of democracy because the particular and peculiar practices of adjudication
produce, redistribute, and curb power among disputants who disagree in public about the
import of legal rights”).
18. Notes of Hearing 22, Centerville ( Judge 1) (addressing litigants in open court).
See also infra notes 116–123 and accompanying text for more on the underlying data.
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not necessarily resolve disputes. Rather, they actually face and respond in
diﬀerent ways to people’s social needs.
We use the term “social need” consistent with scholarly literature and
note that it captures the range of needs (including those that some might
characterize as economic) that are inextricable from racial, economic, and
gender inequality.19 We are intentionally not using the term “legal need.”
The concept of “legal need” itself reflects assumptions about the role of
law in people’s lives, which research shows is not consistent with people’s
lived experiences.20 Our examination takes an institutional view of state
civil courts and the problems people bring to them---and resists any underlying assumption that people should engage the legal system to resolve
their problems.
In this context, we engage in a mixed-methods empirical examination
of state civil courts. We take a novel approach to national data on state civil
caseloads, recategorizing cases to reflect the problems people are bringing
to court, not just the formal legal labels for these cases. This reveals the
breadth and depth of social needs presented to state civil courts. We then
examine qualitative data from observations and interviews in state civil
courtrooms to understand how people’s social needs appear in the courtroom. In the following sections, we analyze how state civil courts respond
to the institutional mismatch.
19. See Jonathan Bradshaw, A Taxonomy of Social Need, in Problems and Progress in
Medical Care: Essays on Current Research 71, 71--74 (Gordon McLachlan ed., 1972);
Mohsen Asadi-Lari, Chris Packham & David Gray, Need for Redefining Needs, 34 Health
Quality Life Outcomes 1, 4 (2003) (distinguishing social needs from physical needs,
satisfaction, informational needs, and concern); Giandomenica Becchio, Social Needs,
Social Goods, and Human Associations in the Second Edition of Carl Menger’s Principles,
46 Hist. Pol. Econ. 247, 249–51 (2014) (describing how economic goods can satisfy social
needs, including common needs (needs shared by many individuals that a common supply
can satisfy, such as drinking water), collective needs (needs demanded by individuals and
shared by the community, such as schools), and needs of human association (needs
demanded by an entity other than individuals)); Erica Hutchins Coe, Jenny Cordina,
Danielle Feﬀer & Seema Parmar, Understanding the Impact of Unmet Social Needs on
Consumer Health and Healthcare, McKinsey & Co. (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/
understanding-the-impact-of-unmet-social-needs-on-consumer-health-and-healthcare
[https://perma.cc/BUY5-B79G] (summarizing findings from a McKinsey survey). Applying
the distinctions in Professor Jonathan Bradshaw’s taxonomy of “normative need,” “felt
need,” “expressed need,” and “comparative need” to state civil courts is beyond the scope
of this Essay, though it engages many of the questions raised by Professor Rebecca
Sandefur’s work. We also note that narrower definitions of social needs appear in other
contexts, including public benefits legislation. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3002(24) (2018) (“The
term ‘greatest social need’ means the need caused by noneconomic factors . . . .”).
20. Professor Sandefur’s research shows that people regularly do not perceive their
problems as legal and believe they are able to help themselves, and she theorizes the
implications of these perceptions for the legal system. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Accessing
Justice in the Contemporary USA: Findings From the Community Needs and Services Study
14--16 (2014); Rebecca L. Sandefur, What We Know and Need to Know About the Legal
Needs of the Public, 67 S.C. L. Rev. 443, 443--44 (2016).
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The Institutional Context

1. Courts Designed for Dispute Resolution. — The substantive law and
procedure of state civil courts rest on the premise that they are sites of
dispute resolution. We assume parties will come with a dispute, and the
court will resolve it.21 That dispute might get resolved in a formalized,
adversarial way that involves lawyers. Or it might get resolved by partydriven settlement. Or the dispute might be resolved in a collaborative way
involving a third-party facilitator. Regardless of where the process falls on
a continuum of adversarialism, the premise remains: State civil courts are
in the business of resolving disputes between parties.
This dispute resolution assumption is present in the law and procedure of state civil courts and permeates legal scholarship, including our
own. Legal scholarship’s focus on federal courts and the idealized, represented, adversarial system is well documented.22 Scholarship regarding
state civil courts is largely focused on particular actors or characteristics of
dispute resolution.23 Even the most full-throated calls for reconsideration
of adversarialism still accept that courts are sites of dispute resolution.24
Sociolegal research regarding legal problems and experiences similarly relies on the premise of dispute resolution to examine questions of
civil courts. The classic sociolegal “dispute pyramid” and its progeny,
including the “dispute tree,” as well as the classic framing of legal engagement as “naming, blaming, and claiming,” all take as a starting point that
the business of courts is dispute resolution.25 The extensive work of leading

21. Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 3 (2d ed. 2019).
22. Pamela Bookman & Colleen F. Shanahan, A Tale of Two Civil Procedures, 122
Colum. L. Rev. 1183, 1186–88 (2022); Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F.
Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Studying the “New” Civil Judges, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 249, 268–74
[hereinafter Carpenter et al., “New” Civil Judges].
23. See Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8, at 530
(“[U]nderstanding judges’ within-case decisions about role implementation, procedure,
and oﬀers of assistance to pro se litigants is a critical contribution . . . .”); Carpenter et al.,
“New” Civil Judges, supra note 22, at 256 (“In this article, we make the case for a research
agenda focused on state courts and the judges who manage and work within them.”);
Colleen F. Shanahan, The Keys to the Kingdom: Judges, Pre-Hearing Procedure, and Access
to Justice, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 215, 218 (focusing on the role of judges in state civil and
administrative courts); Steinberg et al., Judges and Deregulation, supra note 9, at 1316
(drawing on interviews to demonstrate that “state court judges are leading the charge, out
of necessity, toward de facto deregulation of the legal profession, at least in certain pro se
courts”).
24. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 5, 5–6 (1996) (noting that the
adversary system is no longer the “best method for our legal system”); Steinberg, Adversary
Breakdown, supra note 8, at 899 (“Though adversary theory continues to represent the
guiding framework for criminal and civil cases, it is now widely recognized that the
traditional depiction of the passive judge is incomplete.”).
25. See Catherine R. Albiston, Lauren B. Edelman & Joy Milligan, The Dispute Tree
and the Legal Forest, 10 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 105, 107 (2014); William L.F. Felstiner,
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scholars like Professors Hazel Genn and Rebecca Sandefur concerning
how people understand and act on their own legal problems still takes as
a core premise that the matters handled by civil courts are disputes to be
resolved by the court in some way. Professor Genn’s early work regarding
legal problems in the United Kingdom illustrated that people are less
likely to engage the law in disputes involving purchases of goods and services and more likely to go to court in disputes based in relationships or
family.26 Professor Sandefur’s work, among other contributions, defines
justiciable events, legal needs, and cases.27 These definitions lend needed
clarity to access to justice research, yet reflect the pervasiveness of the
dispute resolution construct. Collectively, this research is commonly characterized as telling us that people take their “more serious” disputes to
court, that poor people “perceive” fewer legal problems in their lives, or
that many people “do nothing” in the face of a justiciable event or legal
case.28 We suggest an alternate explanation: People have problems to be
resolved that are social needs more than disputes, and this diﬀerence
underlies their interaction with civil courts. But before we reach that analysis, we observe that, even in an analysis of underlying problems, the
construct of dispute resolution is pervasive.
The premise of dispute resolution also characterizes the predominant
approaches to reform. In some instances, our reaction to the dysfunction
of state civil courts is to change the actors involved in dispute resolution.
This includes alternative dispute resolution methods and approaches like
community courts. Another approach is to change the nature of how
disputes are resolved, such as shifting to inquisitorial or problem-solving
court models. Yet all of these approaches stay within the boundaries of
dispute resolution: The court engagement begins with two parties presenting the court with a dispute and ends with the court oﬀering some method
of resolution.
2. Inequality. — The premise that civil courts are sites of dispute resolution coexists with the underlying circumstances of inequality in the
United States. Thus, our examination of state civil courts rests on the collective, scholarly understanding of inequality in the United States and the

Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 Law & Soc’y Rev. 631, 632 (1980).
26. Hazel Genn, What Is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice, 24 Yale
J.L. & Humans. 397, 405–06 (2012).
27. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Sandefur & James Teufel, Assessing America’s Access to Civil
Justice Crisis, 11 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 753, 755–63 (2021) (noting that a justiciable event is a
circumstance shaped by civil law, a legal need is a justiciable event that needs legal expertise
to be handled “properly,” and a case is a circumstance that ends up in court or a legal service
system).
28. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and
Responses of Inaction, in Transforming Lives: Law and Social Process 112, 112–17 (Pascoe
Pleasence, Alexy Buck & Nigel J. Balmer eds., 2007).
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failure of the executive and legislative branches of government to address
it.
Income and wealth inequality in the United States is significant and
growing.29 Our historical arc of growing inequality is bound up in the
country’s history of racial inequality.30 In 2019, the net worth of a typical
white family was nearly ten times that of the average Black family.31 Scholars have extensively documented the historical underpinnings of this
inequality.32 Economic and social scientific research documents how

29. In 2021, the top 1% of U.S. citizens owned 32% of the country’s
household
wealth,
while
the
bottom
half
owned
only
2%.
Distribution of Household Wealth in the U.S. Since 1989, Fed Rsrv.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/distribute/chart/#quarter:128;series:
Net%20worth;demographic:networth;population:1,3,5,7;units:shares [https://perma.cc/VLE9E9R2] (last updated Dec. 17, 2021).
30. The wealth gap between America’s richest and poorest families has more than
doubled from 1989 to 2016. Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Ruth Igielnik & Rakesh Kochhar,
Pew Rsch. Ctr., Most Americans Say There Is Too Much Economic Inequality in the U.S.,
but Fewer Than Half Call It a Top Priority 18–19 (2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/socialtrends/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2020/01/PSDT_01.09.20_economic-inequailty_FULL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S5KV-LX7A] (documenting the percent change in median family wealth
over time by quintile).
31. Kriston McIntosh, Emily Moss, Ryan Nunn & Jay Shambaugh, Examining the BlackWhite Wealth Gap, Brookings (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap/
[https://perma.cc/2MTXJS7P] (comparing wealth for median white and median Black households); see also Ana
Hernández Kent & Lowell Ricketts, Has Wealth Inequality in America Changed Over Time?
Here Are Key Statistics, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2020/december/has-wealth-inequality-changedover-time-key-statistics [https://perma.cc/AJ73-GFGR] (noting that the median white
family owns $184,000 in assets, while Black families own $23,000, and Hispanic families own
$38,000). Income statistics reveal similarly stark disparities: The median Black household
earned $23,800 less than white households in 1970, but $33,000 less in 2018, amounting to
just 61% of the income of the median white family. Katherine Schaeﬀer, 6 Facts About
Economic
Inequality
in
the
U.S.,
Pew
Rsch.
Ctr.
(Feb.
7,
2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/6-facts-about-economic-inequalityin-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/7TYB-8YTM] (measuring changes in relative income in
constant 2018 dollars).
32. See, e.g., Robert S. Browne, The Economic Basis for Reparations to Black America,
2 Rev. Black Pol. Econ. 67, 73 (1971) (noting that income produced by enslaved people for
their white owners before 1860 amounted to between $448 and $995 billion). See generally
Brittany Danielle Rawlinson, The Legacy of Slavery and Black-White Wealth Inequality in
the Southern United States (Apr. 6, 2017) (Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University),
https://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/islandora/object/fsu:507725/datastream/PDF/view
[https://perma.cc/N45B-ZUX5] (oﬀering an empirical analysis of home ownership,
business ownership, anti-Black lynchings, and incarceration as contributory factors to the
wealth gap, and connecting these practices to the legacy of slavery); Terry Gross, A
‘Forgotten History’ of How the U.S. Government Segregated America, NPR (May 3, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/05/03/526655831/a-forgotten-history-of-how-the-u-s-governmentsegregated-america [https://perma.cc/P2NY-MEG9] (documenting America’s history of
discrimination in housing).
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discrimination in employment,33 housing,34 education,35 and criminal justice36 combine to produce vastly unequal conditions on account of race—
and how intergenerational poverty perpetuates this history.37 These
conditions are not just abstract. They translate to specific problems for
individuals and communities: unaﬀordable housing, limited access to
health care, childcare and elder care, insuﬃcient employment
opportunities and income, and an absence of pathways to build wealth or
benefit from credit.
Scholars have explored how the actions and inactions of U.S. political
institutions—legislatures and executives—have amplified American inequality.38 Some literature describes this connection in terms of
institutional decisions and outcomes. For example, many scholars emphasize decreases in the real minimum wage and accompanying increases in
wage inequality.39 Other research describes weakened labor protections
33. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,
94 Am. Econ. Rev. 991, 1101 (2004) (showing that African Americans face diﬀerential
treatment when searching for jobs); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971) (providing an example of widespread discriminatory employment practices
deployed in the post-Jim Crow era to harm Black workers).
34. See, e.g., Janelle Jones, The Racial Wealth Gap: How African-Americans Have Been
Shortchanged Out of the Materials to Build Wealth, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://www.epi.org/blog/the-racial-wealth-gap-how-african-americans-have-beenshortchanged-out-of-the-materials-to-build-wealth/
[https://perma.cc/8P2U-C53C]
(describing the significance of home equity for wealth accumulation and the structural
barriers to homeownership for Black Americans).
35. See Graziella Bertocchi & Arcangelo Dimico, Slavery, Education, and Inequality 1
(Inst.
for
the
Study
of
Lab.,
Working
Paper
No.
5329,
2010),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51891/1/66886687X.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2WPQ-MBXD] (“[T]he current degree of educational inequality, along
the racial dimension, can be traced to the intensity of slavery before the Civil War.”); Linda
Darling-Hammond, Unequal Opportunity: Race and Education, Brookings (Mar. 1, 1998),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unequal-opportunity-race-and-education/
[https://perma.cc/3SKW-C9S4] (describing persistent patterns of discrimination in
education, especially financing and school resources).
36. See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the
Age of Colorblindness (2012) (describing the financial, social, and cultural implications of
mass incarceration on Black communities in the United States).
37. See Scott Winship, Christopher Pulliam, Ariel Gelrud Shiro, Richard V. Reeves &
Santiago Deambrosi, Long Shadows: The Black-White Gap in Multigenerational Poverty 2
(2021), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Long-Shadows_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2VPR-7M95].
38. For visualizations of wealth and income inequality in the United States and around
the world, see Income Inequality, USA, 1913–2021, World Inequality Database,
https://wid.world/country/usa/ [https://perma.cc/6RJN-MAK7] (last visited Mar. 2,
2022).
39. See, e.g., Tali Kristal & Yinon Cohen, The Causes of Rising Wage Inequality: The
Race Between Institutions and Technology, 15 Socio-Econ. Rev. 187, 188–90 (2017) (finding
that between 1968 and 2012, declining unions and reductions in the real minimum wage
accounted for approximately half of the increase in wage inequality in the United States).
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and its implications for income inequality.40 Some scholars emphasize
increasingly regressive state and federal tax codes, favorable treatment of
capital over income, and increasingly unequal distributions of wealth.41
Others tell of the varied role of American government in social provision
over time and in diﬀerent eras of social welfare design.42 Still others chronicle how the privatization of public services has exacerbated inequality,
focusing most intensely on state legislative inaction to secure access to
aﬀordable healthcare,43 state divestment from public education,44 and failures to invest in aﬀordable housing.45

40. Id. at 189; see also Richard B. Freeman, Union Wage Practices and Wage
Dispersion Within Establishments, 36 Indus. & Lab. Rels. Rev. 3, 19–20 (1982) (describing
how labor unionization reduces wage inequality).
41. See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, The Triumph of Injustice: How the Rich
Dodge Taxes and How to Make Them Pay 6–7, 9 (2019) (describing how capital,
disproportionately owned by wealthy people, is taxed more favorably than income, and
describing increasing regression in the U.S. tax system); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman,
Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence From Capitalized Income Tax
Data 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20625, 2014),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w20625/w20625.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2UG9-93JU] (providing an account of increased wealth inequality).
42. See, e.g., Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers 4–11 (1995) (tracing
the history of U.S. government provision of social services over time).
43. Many states refused to expand Medicaid after the passage of the Aﬀordable Care
Act, despite significant federal incentives to do so, thereby increasing inequality. See Robert
Kaestner & Darren Lubotsky, Health Insurance and Income Inequality, 30 J. Econ. Persps.
53, 55 (2016) (finding that public investment in Medicare and Medicaid “clearly [has] the
eﬀect of reducing inequality”); Olena Mazurenko, Casey P. Balio, Rajender Agarwal, Aaron
E. Carroll & Nir Menachemi, The Eﬀects of Medicaid Expansion Under the ACA: A
Systematic Review, 37 Health Aﬀs. 944, 946 (2018) (noting that Medicaid expansion under
the ACA increased insurance coverage); Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion
Decision, Kaiser Fam. Found., https://www.kﬀ.org/health-reform/state-indicator/stateactivity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-aﬀordable-care-act/?currentTimeframe
=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
[https://perma.cc/2ZZR-7ST9] (last updated Feb. 24, 2022) (documenting state decisions
on whether to expand Medicaid after the ACA and identifying dozens of states declining
Medicaid expansion).
44. See Michael Mitchell, Michael Leachman & Matt Saenz, State Higher Education
Funding Cuts Have Pushed Costs to Students, Worsened Inequality, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y
Priorities 1 (2019), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-24-19sfp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D3RD-PG9P] (finding that state fiscal divestment increased inequality);
Michelle Jackson & Brian Holzman, A Century of Educational Inequality in the United
States, 117 PNA 19108, 19114 (2020) (finding that “collegiate inequalities and income
inequality are, in fact, rather strongly associated over the twentieth century”).
45. Joint
Ctr.
for
Hous.
Stud.
of
Harv.
Univ.,
The
State
of
the
Nation’s
Housing
2020,
at
7
(2020),
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_The_State_of_t
he_Nations_Housing_2020_Report_Revised_120720.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4FGG-6XQ4]
(showing a sustained increase in cost-burdened households since 2000 and describing significant
decreases in housing assistance as a share of nondefense discretionary spending over the same
period).

2022]

INSTITUTIONAL MISMATCH

1483

Other literature describes how the American political process has
produced inequality. For example, scholars point to how permissive campaign finance laws permit the rich to exercise disproportionate influence
over legislative, electoral, and regulatory processes46 and to how policymaking itself is structurally designed to favor capture by monied interests.47 Others argue that state legislative gerrymandering reduces political
responsiveness and accountability, empowering special interests to exacerbate inequality.48 Scholars note that the failure to address inequality is
caused by legislative gridlock—itself the result of a policymaking process
that involves multiple veto points49 and must function amid increasing
political polarization.50 Another field of literature highlights how ideological shifts that increasingly favor free-market capitalism and individual
responsibility undergird political inaction on inequality.51

46. Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry E. Brady & Sidney Verba, Growing Economic
Inequality and Its (Partially) Political Roots, Religions, May 18, 2017, at 1, 2,
https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/8/5/97/htm
[https://perma.cc/QR6L-QXKV]
(“Those who are economically well-oﬀ speak more loudly in politics by giving more money
and by engaging more frequently in . . . political participation . . . . Not only is money a
critical resource for both individual and organizational input into politics, but economic
disparities shape the content of political conflict.”).
47. See, e.g., Scott H. Ainsworth, The Role of Legislators in the Determination of
Interest Group Influence, 22 Legis. Stud. Q. 517, 517 (1997). And, of course, this is a
reflection of straightforward collective action problems. See generally Mancur Olson, The
Logic of Collective Action (rev. ed. 1971) (noting that although all members of a group have
“a common interest in obtaining [some kind of] collective benefit, they have no common
interest in paying the cost of providing that collective good,” because “[e]ach would prefer
that the others pay the entire cost”).
48. Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Why Hasn’t
Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. Econ. Persps. 103, 103–05 (2013) (describing
five reasons why the U.S. political system failed to ameliorate rising income inequality:
ideological shifts, low voter participation by poor people, an increase in real income and
wealth that blunts redistributive movements, political influence by the rich, and a reduction
in democratic accountability).
49. John Voorheis, Nolan McCarty & Boris Shor, Unequal Incomes, Ideology, and
Gridlock: How Rising Inequality Increases Political Polarization 5 (Aug. 21, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2649215 [https://perma.cc/U6JK6KFB] (claiming that “[i]ncreases in political polarization may . . . reduce the capacity of
legislators to (a) enact policies which might constrain further increases in inequality . . . or
(b) engage in redistribution to directly reduce inequality . . . or (c) modernize and reform
welfare state institutions”).
50. Id. at 2–3.
51. See Bonica et al., supra note 48, at 105–10 (“The Democratic party pushed through
the financial regulation of the 1930s, while the Democratic party of the 1990s undid much
of this legislation in its embrace of unregulated financial capitalism . . . .”); Sara Sternberg
Greene, The Bootstrap Trap, 67 Duke L.J. 233, 243–51 (2017) (describing how “the cultural
and accompanying policy shift in American society that emphasized personal responsibility
and work as the basis for a reduced safety net” influenced “policy and law surrounding safety
net programs”); Vicki Lens, Public Voices and Public Policy: Changing the Social Discourse
on “Welfare”, 29 J. Socio. & Soc. Welfare 137, 141–46 (2002) (discussing the politicized
language that comprised the discourse on welfare reform).
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The literature on American inequality places heavy responsibility for
people’s social needs on the political branches of government. While it is
not our current purpose to evaluate the explanatory power of these lines
of research, we leverage this body of scholarship as a foundation of our
examination of state civil courts. We acknowledge that we do not capture
the full political dynamics of inequality in the United States, the consequences of this structural problem, or even the range of institutions
wrapped up in these challenges. Rather, we contribute to those conversations by examining state civil courts in this context. How do dispute
resolution design and American inequality simultaneously appear in state
civil courts, and what does that mean for the institutional role that these
courts are actually playing?
B.

State Civil Case Data Reconsidered

In this context of dispute resolution design and social inequality, what
are state civil courts doing? A reexamination of national caseload data
from state civil courts provides a baseline empirical understanding of their
work. We resist traditional scholarly and court management classifications
of cases based on area of law and instead examine the nature of the problem that people face in each case. We might expect to find that people are
asking courts to resolve disputes, consistent with their institutional design.
Our reexamination of the case data reveals otherwise. Instead, we see the
overwhelming presence of social needs in state civil courts.
We use National Center for State Courts (NCSC) data from 2012 to
2019.52 These are approximately 400 million state court matters filed over
eight years. This is not a complete picture of state civil courts, as described
more fully in the Appendix, but it captures the work of these courts in
states where the vast majority of the population lives.53 NCSC categorizes
52. As described in the Appendix, our analysis is based on publicly available data from
the National Center for State Courts from 2012–2019. The data have meaningful variation
among states in both data reporting practices and underlying court structures and
functions. Nonetheless, the data are suﬃcient to explore the theoretical questions we
engage and, we hope, for broader exploration by others of other questions of state courts
as institutions.
53. A chorus has described the challenges of empirical research in state courts. See
Carpenter et al., “New” Civil Judges, supra note 22, at 266 (“Unlike the federal courts, where
data can be downloaded with a few mouse clicks, information from state civil court dockets
remains much less accessible, and in some cases inaccessible, to researchers.”); Sandefur &
Teufel, supra note 27, at 771 (“No consistently collected, nationally representative
information exists to inform on cases, their distributions, or their impacts.”); see also Nat’l
Ctr. for State Cts., Civil Justice Initiative: The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts,
at iii (2015), https://www.nsc.org/_data/assets/pdf_file/0020/13376/civiljusticereport2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AJB-SHUD] [hereinafter NCSC, Landscape of Civil
Litigation in State Courts] (“Diﬀerences among states concerning data definitions, data
collection priorities, and organizational structures make it extremely diﬃcult to provide
national estimates of civil caseloads with suﬃcient granularity to answer the most pressing
questions of state court policymakers.”); Brian J. Ostrom, Shauna M. Strickland & Paula L.
Hannaford-Agor, Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976–2002, 1 J. Empirical Legal
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state cases by category—civil, criminal, juvenile, domestic relations, and
traﬃc—and by case type within each category—such as the “intentional
tort” case type within the “civil” category.
We start by asking which cases are civil justice matters, independent
of NCSC categories. Our categorization diﬀers from traditional
approaches in a core way: We include domestic relations and some matters
related to children, including civil oﬀenses and dependency matters, as
civil matters. What is generally referred to as “family law” is often treated
as separate from analysis of state civil courts.54 Our approach is consistent
with our theoretical perspective. All of the matters in our civil justice needs
category that are designated as case types “Personal Relationships” and
“Children” are matters handled in a civil court in the relevant jurisdiction,
in most states by the same judges who hear (by eligibility or in fact) the
breadth of civil cases. They are adjudicated based on the same dispute resolution design, resting on the same conventions of procedure and
evidence. We believe this categorization most closely tracks the theoretical
argument we engage here. It also presents an intentional contrast with the
categorizations used in NCSC’s commonly cited and pathbreaking 2015
Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts report and work that builds on
it.55 This approach also allows us to create a separate “juvenile delinquency” category that more closely parallels adult criminal dockets and
reflects the diﬀerent institutional structure and role of juvenile courts.
Stud. 755, 756 (2004) (“The perennial difficulty in compiling accurate and comparable data
at the state level can in large measure be pinned on the fact that there are 50 states with at
least 50 diﬀerent ways of doing business and 50 diﬀerent levels of commitment to data
compilation.”); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Paying Down the Civil Justice Data Deficit: Leveraging
Existing National Data Collection, 68 S.C. L. Rev. 295, 297 n.6 (2016) (noting a lack of
suﬃcient detail in electronic case records).
54. We cannot claim a definite explanation for this, but we can observe that state court
dockets are often divided by subject matter, with diﬀerent judges rotating among case types
clustered around family law, criminal law, and other civil matters. We can also observe that
family law matters are generally about women and children and matters historically
undervalued by the legal system and legal scholarship. See Sabbeth & Steinberg, supra note
2 (manuscript at 3–4). Finally, we can observe that this distinction gathers its own
momentum in legal scholarship as one scholar builds on the work of another. See, e.g.,
Yonathan A. Arbel, Adminization: Gatekeeping Consumer Contracts, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 121,
131 & n.42 (2018) (noting that most civil litigation consists of claims for consumer credit);
Richard M. Hynes, Broke but Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Courts, 60
Fla. L. Rev. 1, 21–24 (2008) (same); Wilf-Townsend, supra note 6, at 1715 n.41 (noting that
family and traﬃc cases are excluded from data in analysis).
55. The Landscape report is a source for recent scholarly work (including our own). It
poses two key diﬀerences from our analysis. The first is the categorization of case types and
ultimately what is a “civil” case. The second is that the Landscape report relies on a small
sample (cases from ten counties that are complete reporters in 2012), and we are relying on
aggregate national, multiyear data. We note the consequential distinctions, where relevant,
below. See NCSC, Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts, supra note 53, at iii; see also
Family Justice Initiative, The Landscape of Domestic Relations Cases in State Courts, at i
(2015),
https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/fji-landscapereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/U85Y-Y4V6].
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As captured in Table 1B in the Appendix, in these data, around
eighty-six million cases involve civil justice needs, forty-four million are
adult criminal matters, two million are juvenile delinquency matters, and
over 300 million are noncriminal traﬃc cases.56 But these overall numbers
undercount the country’s civil caseloads because they are the sum of states’
case type reporting, and states report by case type inconsistently and
incompletely. In addition to reporting by case types, states also report their
overall caseloads in a particular category, and this reporting is more complete. For example, as illustrated in the Appendix, from 2012 to 2019, an
average of forty-four states reported their total civil caseloads but an average of only twenty-two states reported across all civil justice needs case
types.57 This second average captures a wide variation within and across
case type reporting. For example, a range of four to thirteen states
reported in the fraud case type, while a range of thirty-four to forty-three
states reported in the adoption case type.58 If we apply our categorization
and proportions to the total category caseload reporting and extrapolate,
a more accurate count of our civil justice needs category would be an
average of almost twenty million cases per year (or approximately 157 million cases in the eight years of data).59 As context, over the same eight years
that state courts saw an annual average of twenty million civil cases, federal
courts saw an annual average of approximately 300,000 civil cases.60
With this understanding of the scope of civil cases, we turn to types of
cases within the civil justice needs category. Typically, cases are classified
using traditional norms of doctrinal law or court management.61 For
example, a case is labeled a “Contract” matter if the dispute arises out of
a contract, regardless of the nature of the parties or their relationship. This
56. See infra Appendix, tbl.1B. The volume and nature of traﬃc cases is worthy of its
own empirical inquiry. We exclude traﬃc cases from our definition of “civil justice matters”
because these cases are generally not handled in a dispute resolution framework but rather
as administrative citations, sometimes with judges who are not lawyers. See Sara Sternberg
Greene & Kristen M. Renberg, Judging Without a J.D., 122 Colum. L. Rev. 1287, 1315
(2022). We note also that these traﬃc dockets implicate questions of local courts. See Ethan
Leib, Local Judges and Local Government, 18 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 707, 730–31
(2015) (“Almost every judge reported that there is locality-state competition for money that
comes from the fines levied by the courts.”); Alexandra Natapoﬀ, Criminal Municipal
Courts, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 964, 1038 (2021) (“[T]raﬃc oﬀenses dominate most municipal
court dockets.”); Justin Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 Va. L. Rev. 1031,
1069 (2020) (“State law gives municipalities the option to create municipal courts, which
handle minor criminal cases as well as local ordinances and traﬃc violations.”).
57. See infra Appendix, tbls.1A & 1B.
58. See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
59. See infra Appendix, tbls.1A & 2. This is the sum of the average annual (2012–2019)
NCSC total civil (14,805,679) + NCSC domestic relations (4,487,066) + NCSC juvenile case
types noted in Table 1B (293,522) = 19,586,267.
60. See infra Appendix, tbl.3.
61. Elizabeth Chambliss, Evidence-Based Lawyer Regulation, 97 Wash. U. L. Rev. 297,
339–40 (2019) (“State court case management systems were developed for operational use,
rather than research.”).
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approach assumes that the problems people bring to court are disputes
with others and categorizes those problems based on their legal constructs.
Through this approach, a dispute between two corporations over a manufacturing contract is conflated with a suit by a debt collection company
against a low-income individual who could not pay her medical debt. Or
an eviction suit where a landlord is trying to evict a tenant in need of mental health services for hoarding is counted as a “Property” case in the same
way as a dispute regarding the boundaries between two pieces of corporate-owned real estate.
We take a diﬀerent approach, grounded in the substance of the problem people bring to court. These diﬀerent subcategories of civil cases
reveal social needs in state civil courts, ultimately telling a diﬀerent story
of these courts’ institutional role. Eight of our categories are substantive:
Personal Relationships, Children, Housing, Contract (distinguishing Debt
Collection), Tort, Tax, Property, and Employment. Two are not, reflecting
the limitations of the data: Small Claims matters and Writs and Appeals.
We describe these subcategories from largest to smallest, as reflected in
Table 2.
1. Personal Relationships. — “Personal Relationships” are the biggest
category of cases in state civil courts. These are the cases that involve personal, often familial, relationships rather than purely economic ones. In
total, “Personal Relationships” cases comprise approximately 30% of state
civil court dockets.62 These include divorce, protective orders, guardianship, estates, and personal trusteeship. The common thread in these cases
as they generally appear in state civil court is that they implicate personal
relationships and involve problems that, with more resources, the parties
might not bring to state civil court or would only bring in a ministerial
fashion.63 As the discussion below illustrates, the absence of resources
appears across the types of “Personal Relationships” cases. For example, a
couple seeking divorce but without the resources to retain counsel for
negotiations requires more from the court. An individual seeking to
arrange guardianship for an elderly relative, or resolving an estate after
the death of a loved one, will engage the court in a more limited way if
they can retain counsel to help them navigate the law. And those people
who do need more state civil court involvement are correspondingly making themselves more vulnerable to state control.
Another factor in many of these cases is that parties seek government
assistance in some way, and that assistance then requires state civil court
involvement. We discuss this phenomenon in the context of our qualita-

62. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated six million cases per year (30.28%
of 19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
63. Tonya L. Brito, David J. Pate, Jr. & Jia-Hui Stefanie Wong, “I Do for My Kids”:
Negotiating Race and Racial Inequality in Family Court, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 3027, 3029–30
(2015) (“[T]he adjudication of child support cases shows a judicial colorblindness that
ignores contemporary realities concerning racial inequality in the labor market.”).
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tive data in section I.C below, and it is also apparent in the general substance of these matters. For example, a marital dispute where one party
calls the police to make the other party leave the home, because neither
individual has suﬃcient resources to stay somewhere else, would appear as
a protective order in state court. Or a case in which an elderly person with
dementia requires health care might show up as a guardianship proceeding so that a family member can access legal power and health care services
for the individual.
The largest subset of the “Personal Relationships” category is divorce,
comprising a third of “Personal Relationships” matters.64 The available
data do not show how many of these cases are substantive proceedings and
how many are pro forma proceedings required by law, though recent
research suggests that the latter is a meaningful proportion of these
cases.65 Divorce is paradigmatic of relationship-related civil court matters.
People who can aﬀord counsel are nearly four times more likely to settle
divorce-related matters without involving the court in more than a ministerial fashion.66 For poor families, “more litigation means the stress and
expense of court involvement continues.”67 Many of those families stay
“trapped in marriage” or are mired in resulting litigation (e.g., protective
orders or contract disputes).68 In many states, the legal process for determining child custody, child support, spousal support, and protection
orders is handled separately from divorce, exacerbating access issues.69
Socioeconomic status also impacts “how families fare in divorce and custody cases” which in turn “impacts how [those families] weather the
transition the litigation represents.”70
Another major subset of the “Personal Relationships” cases is protective orders, commonly known as domestic violence cases, which constitute
about a quarter of the “Personal Relationships” cases. As we illustrate using
qualitative data in section I.C below, these cases are deeply intertwined
with manifestations of inequality, including housing instability, need for
64. See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
65. James Greiner, Ellen Lee Degnan, Thomas Ferriss & Roseanna Sommers, Using
Random Assignment to Measure Court Accessibility for Low-Income Divorce Seekers, PNAS,
Mar. 30, 2021, at 1, 5 (noting that while divorces could sometimes be emotionally
complicated, low-income divorce cases ordinarily involved straightforward legal issues).
66. Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Mott, Research on Self-Represented Litigation:
Preliminary Results and Methodological Considerations, 24 Just. Sys. J. 163, 171 (2003)
(noting that representation is a proxy for litigant wealth and finding that in “cases in which
both parties were self-represented . . . less than 7 percent resulted in a settlement,”
indicating that “[t]he appearance of an attorney for either party increased the settlement
rate substantially”).
67. Pamela Cardullo Ortiz, How a Civil Right to Counsel Can Help Dismantle
Concentrated Poverty in America’s Inner Cities, 25 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 163, 188 (2014).
68. Greiner et al., supra note 65, at 5.
69. Id.
70. Ortiz, supra note 67, at 187 (using representation as a proxy for socioeconomic
status).
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health care, need for child or other familial care, and general lack of
resources. The vast majority of those seeking protective orders are experiencing poverty, which “limits options, creates stressors and conditions that
promote abuse, and makes it more diﬃcult to escape abuse.”71 Wealthier
people have better access to resources to leave abusive relationships and
secure safety, using nonjudicial means to escape violence.72
The two remaining major subsets of “Personal Relationships” cases
are probate/wills/intestate cases (14% of “Personal Relationships”
cases)73 and mental health cases, which are cases where court intervention
is sought to place or keep an individual in mental health treatment (12%
of “Personal Relationships” cases). Wills and probate matters also implicate socioeconomic status. Wills themselves often cost over $1,000,74 and
those from upper income households are almost twice as likely to have a
will.75 Without one, judicially assigned executors administer estates—again
increasing civil court control over those without the resources needed to
preempt court involvement. This court involvement compounds as parties
initiate additional litigation, especially over assets76 and guardianship.77

71. Jane K. Stoever, Access to Safety and Justice: Service of Process in Domestic
Violence Cases, 94 Wash. L. Rev. 333, 387 (2019); see also Lisa Shannon, TK Logan &
Jennifer Cole, Intimate Partner Violence, Relationship Status, and Protective Orders: Does
“Living in Sin” Entail a Diﬀerent Experience?, 22 J. Interpersonal Violence 1114, 1119
(2007) (finding that in a sample of women with protective orders, 58% had annual incomes
of less than $15,000).
72. Jane K. Stoever, Transforming Domestic Violence Representation, 101 Ky. L.J. 483,
531 (2012) (“Economic dependence is a substantial impediment to separating from an
abusive partner, but financial relief in the form of child support, maintenance, housing
payments, and compensation for medical expenses, lost wages, and damaged property is
enumerated in only a small number of state statutes.”).
73. NCSC collection protocols and categories leave some ambiguity as to the
underlying problems within the Probate/Estate categories. It would be valuable but is
beyond our scope to pair local-level research with NCSC data to better understand who is
using probate court and how. See, e.g., David Horton, In Partial Defense of Probate:
Evidence From Alameda County, California, 103 Geo. L.J. 605, 624–27 (2014) (reporting a
survey of cases in Alameda County).
74. David Dierking, What’s the Average Cost of Making a Will?, Investopedia (Feb. 4,
2022),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/033116/what-average-cost-makingwill.asp#:%7E:text=Drafting%20the%20will%20yourself%20is,it%20will%20be%20error%2
Dfree [https://perma.cc/BT84-LXQD].
75. Jeﬀrey M. Jones, Majority in U.S. Do Not Have a Will, Gallup (May 18, 2016),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/191651/majority-not.aspx [https://perma.cc/786H-CDJG]
(“Of Americans whose annual household income is $75,000 or greater, 55% have a will,
compared with 31% of those with incomes of less than $30,000.”).
76. See, e.g., Andrew Stimmel, Note, Mediating Will Disputes: A Proposal to Add a
Discretionary Mediation Clause to the Uniform Probate Code, 18 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol.
197, 197 (2002) (observing that legal attacks on a will can result in lengthy litigation and
explaining why mediation is a “particularly suitable method of dispute resolution for will
contests”).
77. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Mediation to Resolve
Probate Disputes Over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 397, 413–16
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Appointed guardianship also implicates socioeconomic status. Although court-appointed guardianship for those who have not executed
power of attorney is determined by mental capacity, impoverished elders
are nearly five times more likely to receive court-appointed guardians than
those living above the poverty line.78 Guardianships are often the result of
a lack of “resources to pay for access to common alternatives to guardianship like help with drafting powers of attorney.”79 For older adults in
poverty, “[a] bare cupboard or home in disrepair may be attributed to a
decline in mental capacity due to age instead of other problems: poverty,
physical disability, lack of access to physical and mental healthcare, and a
lack of a social safety net.”80
2. Children. — A second category of cases, “Children,” occupies 15%
of state civil court dockets.81 These are all of the civil matters necessarily
involving children. As reflected in Table 1B, we exclude juvenile delinquency matters because, while not oﬃcially categorized as “criminal,” they
are functionally closer to criminal cases than they are to civil ones. Socioeconomic status significantly aﬀects court involvement among children,
especially in child welfare matters: “Families involved in the child welfare
system overwhelmingly draw from impoverished households.”82 For example, custody and termination of parental rights deeply implicate poverty
and racial inequality. Higher rates of child abuse and neglect may emanate
from the hardships of low socioeconomic status.83 Poor families are also
disproportionately referred to child welfare,84 often inappropriately as the

(1997) (noting that guardianship and property disputes are two primary sources of probate
disputes).
78. Joseph Rosenberg, Poverty, Guardianship, and the Vulnerable Elderly, Geo. J. on
Poverty L. & Pol’y 315, 339 (2009) (finding, in a small sample, that 47% of those over sixtyfive with guardians fell below the poverty line, compared to 10.1% of the total population).
79. Nicole Shannon, Emily Miller & Emma Holcomb, Defending Older Clients in
Guardianship
Proceedings,
Mich.
Bar
J.,
Dec.
2020,
at
30,
32,
http://www.michbar.org/file/barjournal/article/documents/pdf4article4063.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TXS8-HWVW].
80. Id.
81. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated three million cases per year (15.45%
of 19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
82. Karen Zilberstein, Parenting in Families of Low Socioeconomic Status: A Review
With Implications for Child Welfare Status, 54 Fam. Ct. L. Rev. 221, 222 (2016); see also
Dorothy Roberts, Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare 7–10, 74–92 (2002).
83. Mary Russell, Barbara Harris & Annemarie Gockel, Parenting in Poverty:
Perspectives of High-Risk Parents, 14 J. Child. & Poverty 83, 83–85 (2008); Zilberstein, supra
note 82, at 222 (citing Leroy H. Pelton, The Continuing Role of Material Factors in Child
Maltreatment and Placement, 41 Child Abuse & Neglect 30, 30–31 (2015)).
84. Colleen E. Janczewski, The Influence of Diﬀerential Response on Decision-Making
in Child Protective Service Agencies, 39 Child Abuse & Neglect 50, 51–52 (2015); Pelton,
supra note 83, at 35–36; Jacqueline Stokes & Glen Schmidt, Race, Poverty and Child
Protection Decision Making, 41 Brit. J. Soc. Work 1105, 1107 (2011).
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result of racial and class bias.85 Moreover, the “physical, emotional, behavioral, cognitive, and environmental problems” experienced by poor children can “result in delinquent behavior or status oﬀending,”86 especially
in truancy matters where poverty leads to absence or misbehavior at
school.87 Poor parents also “may turn to the court for help they could not
otherwise aﬀord.”88 Together, these dynamics of racism and poverty land
children and their families in court.
The “Children” category captures cases that are theoretically distinct:
those that involve two private parties and those that involve the state. The
government is directly involved in more than half of the “Children” cases
in the following ways. First, child support matters where the custodial parent receives government benefits and thus support payments go to the
government (these are approximately 40% of “Children” cases).89 Second,
85. For example, bias may arise in custody disputes, divorce proceedings, or visitation
when reporting abuse or assessing parental behavior. See Alice M. Hines, Kathy Lemon,
Paige Wyatt & Joan Merdinger, Factors Related to the Disproportionate Involvement of
Children of Color in the Child Welfare System: A Review and Emerging Themes, 26 Child.
& Youth Serv. Rev. 507, 521–24 (2004) (“Diﬀerential treatment based on ethnicity and/or
[socioeconomic status], is clearly a factor that may likely contribute to the disproportionate
representation of children of color in the [child welfare system].”); Pelton, supra note 83,
at 34 (finding bias where child welfare workers report abuse on the basis of dirty houses or
other indicia of low income, not the parenting itself).
86. Katherine Hunt Federle, Child Welfare and the Juvenile Court, 60 Ohio St. L.J.
1225, 1237 (1999). Status oﬀenses are acts that are not criminal and only subject to penalty
because of the individual’s age. This includes things like violating curfew, being repeatedly
absent from school, or being present in spaces in ways that have been labeled “loitering.”
See David J. Steinhart, Status Oﬀenses, 6 Future Child. 86, 86 (1996).
87. See Steinhart, supra note 86, at 94.
88. Federle, supra note 86, at 1244.
89. See Jacquelyn L. Boggess, Ctr. for Fam. Pol’y & Prac., Low-Income and NeverMarried Families: Service and Support at the Intersection of Family Court and Child
Support
Agency
Systems
9
(2017),
https://cffpp.org/wpcontent/uploads/CFFPPpaper_BOGGESS_forscreen.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z2X4FK98] (highlighting the problems inherent to the U.S. child support system due to racial
inequity and disparities in poverty and unemployment); Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind
Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their
Families, 15 J. Gender Race & Just. 617, 625 (2012) (describing the distribution scheme for
child support established by the 1984 amendments to the Child Support Act); Tonya L.
Brito, The Child Support Debt Bubble, 9 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 953, 965 (2019) (“[I]n the
majority of IV-D contempt cases, the noncustodial parents’ circumstances involve
unemployment and below poverty wages.”); Eleanor Pratt, Child Support Enforcement Can
Hurt Black, Low-Income, Noncustodial Fathers and Their Kids, Urb. Inst. ( June 16, 2016),
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/child-support-enforcement-can-hurt-black-low-incomenoncustodial-fathers-and-their-kids [https://perma.cc/75QM-PXY3] (“Studies have
estimated that low-income, noncustodial fathers are disproportionately black, and . . . black
men are more likely to be poor, face labor market discrimination, and have more limited
social networks to help them stay employed and able to pay their child support orders.”). For
a qualitative study on how fathers are aﬀected by financial support requirements, see
Elizabeth Clary, Pamela Holcomb, Robin Dion & Kathryn Edin, Oﬀ. of Plan., Rsch. & Eval.,
Providing Financial Support for Children: Views and Experiences of Low-Income Fathers in
the PACT Evaluation 3–4 (2017), https://www.mathematica.org/publications/
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dependency cases involving abuse, neglect, and termination of parental
rights have the relevant child welfare agency as a party (these are collectively 16% of “Children” cases).90 An additional collection of cases may
involve the government but in a less direct capacity, such as paternity matters (14% of “Children” cases) where the government requires a finding
of paternity to justify a child support case.91 The cases that involve solely
private parties include adoption, custody, paternity, visitation, and guardianship and support where the government’s child welfare role is not
involved.
Together, “Personal Relationships” and “Children,” which collectively capture social needs of families, make up about 46% of state civil
court dockets each year in our data.92

providing-financial-support-for-children-views-and-experiences-of-low-income-fathers
[https://perma.cc/VD4N-NMYW].
90. In re Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45, 55 (Ohio 1991) (“A termination of parental rights is
the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.”); see also Michele R. Forte,
Note, Making the Case for Eﬀective Assistance of Counsel in Involuntary Termination of
Parental Rights Proceedings, 28 Nova L. Rev. 193, 193–94 (2003) (calling the termination
of parental rights “the ‘death penalty’ of juvenile law” as “[i]t constitutes a direct
interference by the state into a parent’s ‘essential’ right to conceive and raise one’s child”
(first quoting Appellant’s Initial Brief on the Merits at 3, N.S.H. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. &
Fam. Servs., 843 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2003) (No. SC02-261), 2002 WL 32131297; then quoting
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))). A 2020 study analyzed data from children in
the U.S. foster care system since 2000. The study found that “African American children are
2.4 times more likely than White children to experience the termination of parental
rights.” Christopher Wildeman, Frank R. Edwards & Sara Wakefield, The Cumulative
Prevalence of Termination of Parental Rights for U.S. Children, 2000–2016, 25 Child
Maltreatment 32, 33 (2020). Additionally, the study provides that “[t]ermination of parental
rights . . . is likely far more consequential because it signals the end of attempts to reunify
parents and children and . . . leads to immediate attempts to place children in adoptive
homes.”
Id.;
see
also
Child.’s
Bureau,
Child
Welfare Practice to Address Racial Disproportionality and Disparity 1–23 (2021),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/racial_disproportionality.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M6TYZX8] (providing an “overview on the issue of racial disproportionality and disparity in the
child welfare system and the factors that contribute to the problem”).
91. See Stacy Brustin, More Than a Witness: The Role of Custodial Parents in the IV-D
Child Support Process, 26 Child.’s Legal Rts. J. 37, 37–39 (2006) (discussing the federal
requirement that states mandate that recipients assign any right to benefits to the state who
then enforces the obligation on the noncustodial parent); Paula Roberts, In the Frying Pan
and in the Fire: AFDC Custodial Parents and the IV-D System, 18 Clearinghouse Rev. 1407,
1408 (1985) (“This cooperation [between the IV-D agent and the custodial parent] includes
identifying and locating the absent parent, establishing paternity, and obtaining support or
any other payments due . . . . [T]he parent may be required to go to the IV-D oﬃce for
appointments . . . , appear as a witness . . . and provide information under oath.”); Paternity,
Legal
Assistance
Ctr.,
https://legalassistancecenter.org/get-help/paternity/
[https://perma.cc/632D-ZBZS] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022) (outlining the prerequisite
of paternity and its process before the court can order child support from the father).
92. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated nine million cases per year (45.73%
of 19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
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3. Housing. — A third category of cases, “Housing,” is 15% of state civil
court dockets.93 These are landlord–tenant matters, including eviction,
and mortgage foreclosure cases. This category is likely an undercount of
the number of people facing eviction or foreclosure, as it does not capture
those housing-debt-related cases that appear on small claims dockets.94
Collectively, the substance of these cases involves either people at risk
of losing their homes or people trying to improve the conditions of their
homes. Eviction and foreclosure as causes and consequences of economic
inequality are well-documented.95 This research demonstrates, and current policy conversations echo, how interwoven housing instability is into
the fabric of social inequality in this country. Similarly, disparate involvement in housing cases reflects the country’s racial inequality and
corresponding starker social needs.96 Housing conditions cases—where
tenants are trying to get landlords to make repairs—are similarly
concentrated among low-income tenants.97 This, too, is both a cause and
93. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated three million cases per year (14.95%
of 19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
94. Housing data suggest as many as five million people a year are subject to eviction.
Housing Loss in the United States: Our National Rankings and Maps, New Am.,
https://www.newamerica.org/future-land-housing/reports/displaced-america/housingloss-in-the-united-states-our-national-rankings-and-maps/ [https://perma.cc/KD3L-KMFR]
(last visited Feb. 10, 2022) (pointing out that U.S. housing data is poor and incomplete but
providing a 2014 to 2016 average rate with available data); see also National Estimates:
Eviction in America, Eviction Lab (May 11, 2018), https://evictionlab.org/nationalestimates/ [https://perma.cc/8HTR-42DJ] (showing data that the number, but not
necessarily the rate, of evictions has increased, though their sample excludes California and
New York).
95. Regarding eviction, see Monica Bell & Matthew Desmond, Housing, Poverty, and
the Law, 11 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 15, 19 (2015) (suggesting that “[t]enant screening on
the basis of previous evictions and convictions” may “foster inequality”); Matthew Desmond,
Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 Am. J. Socio. 88, 91 (2012) (listing
negative consequences of eviction); Matthew Desmond & Carl Gershenson, Housing and
Employment Insecurity Among the Working Poor, 63 Soc. Probs. 46, 60 (2016) (“Forced
removal from housing may serve as a crucial turning point in the lives of poor working
families, with eviction leading to job loss, which in turn can result in durable earnings losses
and nontrivial negative health outcomes.”). Regarding foreclosure, see Antwan Jones,
Gregory D. Squires & Cynthia Ronzio, Foreclosure Is Not an Equal Opportunity Stressor:
How Inequality Fuels the Adverse Health Implications of the Nation’s Financial Crisis, 37 J.
Urb. Aﬀs. 505, 519–20 (2015) (concluding that “foreclosures, health, and income inequality
are intricately interrelated”); Gregory D. Squires, Inequality, Advocacy, and the Foreclosure
Crisis, 8 J. Applied Soc. Sci. 85, 87 (2014) (asserting that “[c]hanges in home equity largely
account for the spike in wealth inequality” in recent years); see also supra notes 1, 32, 45.
96. For empirical studies capturing stark racial disparities in housing cases, see supra
note 1.
97. James Krieger & Donna L. Higgins, Housing and Health: Time Again for Public
Health Action, in Urban Health: Readings in the Social, Built, and Physical Environments
of U.S. Cities 101, 106 (H. Patricia Hynes & Russ Lopez eds., 2009); see also David E. Jacobs,
Environmental Health Disparities in Housing, 101 Am. J. Pub. Health 115, 116 (2011)
(“Clearly, the prevalence rates [of people living in moderately substandard housing] are
higher among racial and ethnic minorities . . . .”).
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consequence of inequality rooted in the country’s history of segregation
and health inequities.98
4. Small Claims (Including Debt Collection). — A fourth category is diﬃcult to parse: “Small Claims” cases. This is 19% of the state civil court dockets and is a mix of tort, contract, and property matters.99 This proportion
varies by state, and there is limited data disaggregating these case types.100
What we do know suggests that “Debt Collection” matters dominate
this part of state civil courts. The limited data suggest that “Small Claims”
dockets are roughly 40 to 60% “Debt Collection” matters, involving a corporate debt buyer suing a low-income individual, with some additional
meaningful proportion including landlord–tenant disputes over payment
of rent or return of security deposits.101 We can extrapolate two things
from the available data. First, the dearth of “Small Claims” data means the
“Housing” proportion reported above does not include “Small Claims”
cases and thus is likely an undercount.

98. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, Edward Rodrigue & Richard V. Reeves, Time for
Justice: Tackling Race Inequalities in Health and Housing, Brookings (Oct. 19, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/time-for-justice-tackling-race-inequalities-in-healthand-housing/ [https://perma.cc/BU2K-DFVB] (describing the housing disparities’
negative consequences and disproportionate eﬀect on Black families).
99. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated four million cases per year (18.92%
of 19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
100. The only (near) national report, using 2013 data, is Paula Hannaford-Agor, Ct.
Stat. Project, The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts: Examining Debt
Collection,
Landlord/Tenant
and
Small
Claims
Cases
(2019),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/26671/caseload-highlights-examinintdebt-collection.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8LK-ACAJ]. In addition, there are a few state- and
city-level reports. See Ricardo Lillo, Access to Justice and Small Claims Courts: Supporting
Latin American Civil Reforms Through Empirical Research in Los Angeles County,
California, 43 R. Ch. D. 955, 973 (2016); Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People’s Court
Examined: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Small Claims Court System, 37 Univ. S.F.
L. Rev. 334, 335 n.121 (2003) (noting that in 2000, Ventura County had a population of
742,000, making it the twelfth most populous county in California); Jennifer Clendening &
Katie Martin, Pew Charitable Trs., How Philadelphia Municipal Court’s Civil Division Works:
Small Claims Cases Can Have a Big Impact on City Residents’ Lives 1--2 (2021),
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2021/02/philadelphia_municipal_courts_civil_division_works.pdf
[https://perma.cc/374R-WNRT]; see also Arthur Bestf, Deborah Zalesne, Kathleen Bridges
& Kathryn Chenoweth, Peace, Wealth, Happiness and Small Claim Courts: A Case Study, 21
Fordham Urb. L.J. 343, 360–62 (1994); Suzanne Elwell & Christopher Carlson, Comment,
The Iowa Small Claims Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 433, 489 (1990); Hynes,
supra note 54, at 41–42; Mary Spector & Ann Baddour, Collection Texas-Style: An Analysis
of Consumer Collection Practices in and out of the Courts, 67 Hastings L.J. 1427, 1429–32
(2016).
101. Hynes, supra note 54, at 49 (estimating that in Virginia actions seeking the
payment of money account for approximately 60% of civil filings); Mary Spector, Debts,
Defaults and Details: Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection Litigation on Consumers and
Courts, 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 257, 273 (2011) (finding that in Texas “suits on debt” accounted
for 43.8% of civil cases filed in county courts statewide).
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Second, we can piece together a view of “Debt Collection” matters
using “Small Claims” and other case types that reveals “Debt Collection”
matters are as big a part—if not bigger—of state civil court business as
“Personal Relationships,” “Children,” and “Housing.” About 5% of the
overall docket (that is, more than half of “Contract” cases) are explicitly
identified as “Debt Collection” matters.102 If we combine these cases and
the very rough estimates of “Small Claims” dockets, “Debt Collection”
matters (excluding housing-related debt collection) are in the range of
15% of state civil court dockets.103 If we include housing-related debt collection, this grows to about 24% of state civil court business.104 As other
research has shown, these cases are closely related to inequality.105
5. The Rest of Civil Justice Needs Cases. — The remaining approximately
one-third of state civil court dockets is spread among many case types,
none constituting more than 10% of civil justice needs cases. Among these
cases is a fourth category of cases: “Contract” cases, making up 8% of the
docket overall.106 As discussed above, this category has meaningful variation within it for our purposes, with about half of “Contract” cases being
“Debt Collection” matters.107 An additional 8% of state civil court cases are
102. In NCSC data, this is called “Seller/Plaintiﬀ” contract cases. See infra Appendix,
tbl.2. This is an estimated one million cases per year (5.06% of 19,586,267 total civil justice
needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
103. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated three million cases per year
(combining 50% of small claims cases with Seller/Plaintiﬀ cases). See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
We note recent scholarship with diﬀerent estimates of debt collection matters. One repeated
statistic is that there are eight million debt collection cases a year in the United States. See
Arbel, supra note 54, at 130; Wilf-Townsend, supra note 6, at 1753. The eight million figure
arises from applying proportional findings from a single state sample to national caseload
data to estimate totals, resulting in a blunter estimate than ours. See Arbel, supra note 54,
at 131 n.42 (applying Hynes and Spector’s 40 to 60% estimate to NCSC total of fifteen
million civil cases per year).
104. If we also include eviction for nonpayment of rent (“landlord tenant unlawful
detainer”) cases, this balloons to 23% of civil justice needs and approximately five million
cases per year. Note that this estimate may not fully capture eviction matters that appear on
small claims dockets, which other data suggest could add another one million cases per year.
See Ashley Gromis, Princeton Univ. Eviction Lab, Eviction: Intersection of Poverty,
Inequality, and Housing 5 (2019), https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wpcontent/uploads/sites/22/2019/05/GROMIS_Ashley_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3N7BL9R]; see also Jenifer Warren, Pew Charitable Trs., How Debt Collectors Are Transforming
the Business of State Courts 6, 8 (2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2020/06/debt-collectors-to-consumers.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLJ2-4JMP].
105. See Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez & Christopher K. Odinet, The Debt Collection
Pandemic, 11 Calif. L. Rev. Online 222, 225–27 (2020) (noting that “income inequality and
depressed wages have exacerbated people’s inability to accumulate any meaningful savings”
such that they have turned to consumer credit for “unexpected emergency expense[s]”);
Spector, supra note 101, at 273–74 (noting reports from Dallas County and other
jurisdictions finding that “civil litigation [comprising debt collection claims] is concentrated
in cities and counties with significant minority populations, lower median income, and lower
home ownership”).
106. See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
107. See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
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miscellaneous appeals from administrative and limited jurisdiction
courts.108 These are not appeals of otherwise counted cases but rather cases
that are appealed from these miscellaneous subsidiary courts directly to
the state civil trial court. A fifth category is “Tort” cases, comprising 2% of
the docket and capturing the full range of intentional torts, malpractice,
and other torts.109 Two-thirds of these matters are automobile-related
torts.110 Finally, “Tax” matters (1%), remaining non-housing “Property”
matters (0.5%), and “Employment” matters (0.1%) round out the
dockets.111
These data describe trial courts. While there are also state appellate
courts in each jurisdiction, state appellate courts are largely insulated from
the matters we describe above. This is due to the nature of appellate
proceedings: Appellate courts receive predetermined facts in a written record and have almost no interaction with litigants. It is also because the
overwhelming number of state civil trial matters involve lawyerless litigants
who do not appeal. As we hope to pursue in future work, this means that
these matters—the individual cases but also the collective substance of
these cases—never make it to the appellate courts.112 We note that, in the
same way trial courts rest on assumptions about dispute resolution, appellate courts rest on a corollary set of assumptions about institutional design
that do not hold true.
6. Quantifying Cases With Social Needs. — Using these civil case types
based on the nature of people’s problems, we categorize cases as “Social
Need Presented” and “Underlying Social Need” cases. In some types of
cases, the social need is squarely presented in the legal system’s definition
of a case. For example, an eviction matter is plainly about whether a person
108. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated one and a half million cases per year
(8.1% of 19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
109. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. This is an estimated 440,000 cases per year (2.25% of
19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year). See supra note 59.
110. See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
111. See infra Appendix, tbl.2. Tax is an estimated 260,000 cases per year; Property an
estimated 94,000 cases per year; and Employment an estimated 18,000 per year (1.33%,
0.48%, and 0.09% of 19,586,267 total civil justice needs cases per year, respectively). See
supra note 59.
112. See Carpenter et al., “New” Civil Judges, supra note 22, at 273–74 & n.103 (noting
that “cases involving pro se parties are unlikely to be appealed”); Llezlie L. Green, Wage
Theft in Lawless Courts, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 1303, 1336 (2019) (explaining that it is
unreasonable to expect a pro se litigant in small claims court to engage successfully in the
process of “crafting a compelling narrative and case theory . . . , particularly where the
litigant must use a narrative process to educate the judge about various statutory legal
protections”); Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, supra note 7, at 85 (“[T]enants
who are represented are three, six, ten, or even nineteen times more likely than pro se
tenants to prevail.”); Sabbeth & Steinberg, supra note 2 (manuscript at 55–56); Colleen F.
Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Can a Little Representation Be a Dangerous
Thing?, 67 Hastings L.J. 1367, 1376 (2016) (pointing out the risks of a lack of legal
representation of less resourced litigants in the form of “second-class legal assistance” and
lacking “the benefit of law reform”).
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remains in housing. Housing is plainly a social need. An eviction matter
can also be—though it is not always—about a landlord needing financial
stability. This additional social need reinforces our categorization. Or a
sister seeking to place a brother under compulsory mental health care is
plainly seeking health (and familial) care. Thus, we can identify these cases
as ones in which social needs are presented in state civil courts. For some
case types, we can imagine a range of problems, some presenting social
needs and some not. Thus, we categorize each subcategory of cases in
Table 2 as presenting a social need, not presenting a social need, or a mix.
Our categorization yields a low estimate of 31% and a high estimate of 90%
of state civil court cases in our data presenting a social need.113
Other cases require a deeper understanding of both the substantive
law and the goings-on in the courtroom to identify a social need. For
example, a domestic violence protective order case as defined by the existing legal system is about two people with a relationship in conflict
involving violence. There may not be an obvious social need presented in
the case type but, as we discuss using qualitative data below, just below the
surface we can identify social needs such as housing, health care, and
childcare. In another example, a defendant in a debt collection action is
on the face of the case defending against a contract claim. One can easily
imagine, however, a case where the facts reveal that the debt in question
is a high-interest, high-fee payday loan, which the defendant needed to pay
her family’s expenses between paychecks.114 In this type of case, we then
see social needs such as childcare, housing support, or better wages related
to the defendant’s contractual liability. We label these “Underlying Social
Need” cases.
Adding the second layer of categorization to the first, the proportion
of state civil cases that include social needs ranges from 46% to 95% of the
cases. Thus, even with our most conservative estimates, 46% of state civil
dockets (or roughly ten million cases per year) present social needs to state
civil courts. This is the equivalent of thirty-five times the average civil
docket of the federal courts.115
C.

Social Needs in the Courtroom

While caseload data illuminate the volume of social needs that arise
in state civil courts, what happens inside these courts illustrates the depth
of the mismatch between people’s needs and courts designed for dispute
113. See infra Appendix, tbl.2.
114. See, e.g., Aimee Picchi, Payday Loans Are Landing People in Jail, CBS News (Feb.
20, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/payday-loans-dickensian-system-is-landingborrowers-in-jail-group-says/ [https://perma.cc/TJK9-HZ7J].
115. It is worth pausing to note the comparison with federal courts. As Table 3 shows,
24% of federal court cases are tort actions, 9% are contracts, 3% are property disputes, and
64% are actions falling under federal statutes (with the bulk of statutory actions being
prisoner petitions (20%) and civil rights actions (14%)).
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resolution. Our own mixed-methods, multijurisdictional study of state civil
courts sheds further light on how state civil courts distort litigants’ social
needs into narrow legal disputes requiring judicially led resolution.116
These data capture courtroom observations of 350 hearings as well as
interviews with judges and other actors in those courtrooms. These data
are drawn from three jurisdictions we refer to as Centerville, Townville,
and Plainville.117 Qualitative analysis reveals that many of these disputes
constitute “Social Need Presented” or “Underlying Social Need” cases.
Our study focused on protective order cases: domestic violence, stalking, and harassment. These cases have a number of characteristics that are
generalizable to the broader state civil caseload. Parties are generally
unrepresented, as they are across state civil courts.118 The law in these cases
is relatively static, and informal procedure abounds.119 Though conventional academic wisdom about civil courts is that the trial is
“disappearing,”120 the opposite is true in state civil courts. The bulk of casedispositive interactions between largely lawyerless litigants and the courts
occur inside courtrooms, including in the cases in our study.121 Finally,
there is some, but uneven, assistance for parties outside the courtroom,
including eﬀorts at negotiated resolutions.122
Protective order law generally requires evidence of (1) an existing
relationship between the parties, (2) a previous incident of violence or fear

116. We discuss the details and methodology of this study in Carpenter et al., Judges in
Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8, at 529–34; Steinberg et al., Judges and Deregulation, supra
note 9, at 1327–28.
117. “The three jurisdictions in our study vary economically, demographically, and
politically. Centerville is a relatively wealthy, politically liberal, and diverse urban center with
appointed judges. Townville is also urban, politically liberal, and diverse, with a very high
poverty rate, a history of economic stagnation and appointed judges. Plainville is majority
white, politically moderate, and sits in a fiscally and socially conservative state where social
and government services of all kinds are under-funded, including the courts.” Carpenter et
al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8, at 531.
118. Id. at 511.
119. Id. at 511 n.4, 521–24.
120. Carpenter et al., “New” Civil Judges, supra note 22, at 274; Marc Galanter, The
Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1255, 1255 (2005);
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459, 459–60 (2004).
121. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Trials and Tribulations of Counting “Trials”, 63 DePaul L.
Rev. 413, 430 (2013); Shanahan, Keys to the Kingdom, supra note 23, at 217 (“In state civil
and administrative courts, the hearing—the in-person interaction that occurs between selfrepresented litigants and judges in the courtroom—is the focal point of the justice
system . . . .”); Jessica K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look
at a Problem-Solving Housing Court, 42 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1058, 1060 (2017) [hereinafter
Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate] (oﬀering evidence that the inquisitorial
procedures in the Housing Conditions Court in the District of Columbia “have the potential
to contribute to accurate outcomes for tenants”).
122. Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8, at 514; Carpenter et al.,
“New” Civil Judges, supra note 23, at 257–61, 277–78.
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of violence, and (3) an ongoing fear of harm.123 These cases are plainly
built on a dispute resolution construct, yet the issues that appear in our
data go far beyond this substantive law. These issues include child custody
and support between parents and other family members, child welfare
proceedings involving the state and one or both parents, elder care and
estate concerns, housing instability, mental health care, addiction, immigration law, career licensing, criminal law matters, and reentry and
probation matters. These issues were not presented in the courtroom as
collateral but were intertwined in the evidence and relief sought in the
course of the protective order cases. We begin in this section with how
social needs are presented in the courtrooms in our data. We save courts’
reactions to these needs as distinct analysis in the following section.
We saw numerous cases where an underlying issue is money to support children, including paying for housing, between parents who do not
live together. For example, in one case, parents cross-filed for protective
orders against each other after a long history of arguments over custody of
their child and who paid particular expenses. Each party alleged physical
violence by the other during arguments over money, in amounts like fifty
dollars for a babysitter.124 This is an example of our “Underlying Social
Need” category where we can plainly observe that litigants have underlying
social needs that are broader and deeper than the bounds of the legally
constructed dispute. Here, those needs might include accessible and
aﬀordable childcare, higher wages, or employment hours compatible with
parenting.
There were a range of cases about caring for family members beyond
minor children, including elder care, and the associated financial burdens. For example, one case involved a petitioner grandmother, her
nonparty granddaughter, and a respondent grandson. The grandson had
used the grandmother’s funds to pay for repairs to her home, made her
stay at his home so he could care for her, and reimbursed himself with the
grandmother’s funds to pay for costs of housing her.125 The granddaughter actively participated in the hearing in support of her grandmother.
Again, the legal system constructed these parties’ problems as about a
dispute between a grandmother and her grandson. Yet if we look beyond
the rigid construct of the legal dispute, we see social needs, including
accessible and aﬀordable elder care and aﬀordable housing.
The data also show cases with roommates presenting disputes over
rent or disagreements about their living situation. One particularly complicated example is a case where a likely mentally ill respondent illegally
sublet one of her bedrooms to the petitioner. When the petitioner learned
of his invalid lease and contacted the actual landlord to protect himself,
the respondent tried to lock him out of the apartment, and there was a
123. Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8, at 535.
124. Notes of Hearing 7, Townville ( Judge 4).
125. Notes of Hearing 23, Townville ( Judge 2).
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physical altercation. The respondent was arrested and remained incarcerated (due to inability to post bail) at the time of the civil court hearing on
the protective order.126 This case, while consistent with the design of
protective order cases due to the violent conflict between the parties,
nonetheless also reveals underlying social needs. Here, those social needs
may involve adequate mental health care, aﬀordable housing, and suﬃcient income or social supports (including for the respondent to be
released from pretrial detention).
Across the cities we observed, addiction and mental health needs were
pervasive. For example, in one case a petitioner was recovering from cancer surgery and her respondent brother, who was addicted to drugs, broke
into her home and assaulted her while looking to steal her pain medication. After the sister reported the robbery and assault to the police, the
brother called the sister’s doctor’s oﬃce, supportive housing, and disability providers trying to obtain another prescription, jeopardizing her benefits and services.127 In another case, a grandmother sought a protective
order against her daughter who had been released from a mental health
facility and was plainly agitated in court. The grandmother’s core problem
was that her daughter kept coming to her house and behaving violently,
which jeopardized the grandmother’s visitation rights with her grandchildren.128 In each of these examples the parties had conflicts involving
violence, and the need for suﬃcient addiction and mental health services
are also immediately apparent.
Though we do not have this depth of data across all case types in state
civil courts, other research illustrates underlying social needs in other
types of cases. For example, Professor Matthew Desmond’s research gives
us the story of Arleen and how a confluence of social needs brought her
to eviction court.129 As housing costs increased and welfare payments and
public housing assistance remained stagnant, Arleen had to devote the vast
majority of her welfare check to rent, leaving her with little money to
provide for her family or cope with emergent financial needs. Toward the
end of 2008, Arleen was at her fourth apartment since the beginning of
the year. After a welfare sanction for a missed appointment and expenses
for a friend’s funeral, she was $870 behind on rent, and her landlord filed
to evict her. In another example, from a report about Philadelphia’s debt
collection docket, a 50-year-old Black woman with an annual income of
$19,200 was the defendant in two collection actions for credit card debt

126.
127.
128.
129.

Notes of Hearing 16, Townville ( Judge 2).
Notes of Hearing 12, Townville ( Judge 2).
Notes of Hearing 21, Plainville ( Judge 1).
Matthew Desmond, Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City 63, 94 (2016).
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accrued when she was hospitalized and lost her job, resulting in damaged
credit and a lien on her home.130
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative data paint a picture
of state civil courts largely occupied with social needs and their
consequences rather than resolving private disputes. These social needs
capture the range of dimensions of inequality: financial means, housing,
health care, and care for children and family members. Further, when we
look at particular subcategories of cases, we see how these needs for social
provision become intertwined with other dynamics of American law and
society.
For example, the relationship between social provision and policing
of Black families appears in state civil court dockets. As others have
theorized, the conflation of poverty with neglect is intertwined with
racism—especially perceptions of Black mothers—and drives state
intervention through the child welfare, foster care, and juvenile detention
systems.131 Even more pointedly, these structures explicitly wield state
power—through state civil court proceedings—to control access to social
provision. As Professor Dorothy Roberts aptly describes, in the child
welfare system “[p]arents must often relinquish custody of their children
to the state in exchange for the services and benefits their families
need.”132 The breadth of mass incarceration exacerbates these
130. Reinvestment Fund, Debt Collection in Philadelphia 18 (2021),
https://www.reinvestment.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/ReinvestmentFund_2021_PHLDebt-Collection.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8T6-EYNJ].
131. Jessica Horan-Block & Elizabeth Tuttle Newman, Accidents Happen: Exposing
Fallacies in Child Protection Abuse Cases and Reuniting Families Through Aggressive
Litigation, 22 CUNY L. Rev. 382, 396 (2019) (“[P]oor parents of color who bring their young
babies and children to Bronx hospitals with certain injuries are often met with interrogation
rather than consolation and compassion. The[se] case anecdotes . . . describe parents
repeatedly being charged with abuse based exclusively on injuries that litigation reveals are
plausibly accidental.”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic
Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1474, 1493 (2012) [hereinafter Roberts,
Systemic Punishment] (“Because they perceive black single mothers as incapable of
providing adequate supervision of their children, oﬃcials believe they are justified in
placing these children under state control . . . . [S]tate oﬃcials apply the myth of black
maternal irresponsibility to justify placing African American children in both juvenile
detention and foster care.”); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Racial Geography of Child Welfare:
Toward a New Research Paradigm, 87 Child Welfare 125, 126 (2008) (presenting a case
study on the eﬀects of the high involvement of child welfare agencies in Black
communities); Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), 95 Colum. L. Rev.
1990, 2008 (1995) (arguing that conceptions of motherhood are informed by racist policies
and stereotypes that serve to demean Black women and cast them as unfit mothers);
Christina White, Federally Mandated Destruction of the Black Family: The Adoption and
Safe Families Act, 1 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 303, 315 (2006) (arguing that Black children are
especially susceptible to state intrusion).
132. Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage
of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1005, 1014 (2001) [hereinafter Roberts,
Criminal Justice and Black Families]; see also Wendy Bach, Prosecuting Poverty,
Criminalizing Care, 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 809, 814 (2019) (describing a Tennessee statute
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dynamics.133 In this part of state civil courts’ work, the presence of
government leads to regulation, punishment, and violence rather than to
litigants’ social needs being met.
In some of these cases dispute resolution is well-matched to the needs
of powerful parties. In such cases, state civil courts directly serve the interests of wealthy parties in extracting or maintaining wealth, in conflict with
the litigant’s need for social provision. For example, state civil courts are
an eﬀective mechanism for debt collection companies to maximize the
value of their investments.134 Historical research suggests this is an intentional feature of these courts’ design.135
Of course, there are social needs that we are not seeing in our data or
in courtrooms more generally because people do not conceptualize their
problems as legal problems and do not engage courts with those problems
they do see as legal.136 Professor Sandefur’s work further questions
whether this small proportion of engagement with courts is problematic
or whether it reflects that problems we define as legal are better solved
outside of court.137 Ultimately, this means that, despite state civil courts
drinking from a fire hose of social needs, the apparent needs are only a
subset of those present in society.
II. HOW COURTS RESPOND TO THE INSTITUTIONAL MISMATCH
“It weighed on me, but I kept thinking, ‘you’re a judge. That’s not your
part.’” 138

that created a crime “not to punish or to exact retribution but to provide care to the
defendants prosecuted for the oﬀense”). As we discuss below, in our data, Centerville has
tied access to housing and other resources to the presence of a protective order. See infra
note 176.
133. See Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families supra note 132, at 1006 (“Because
most prison inmates are parents, incarceration breaks up families by depriving children of
their parents’ emotional and financial support. Juvenile detention and imprisonment also
splinter families because they remove children from their homes, transferring custody from
the parents to the state.”).
134. Wilf-Townsend, supra note 6, at 1712–13. Courts are not the only branch of
government susceptible to being well-suited to pursuing corporate financial interests. See,
e.g., Liz Day, The TurboTax Trap: How the Maker of TurboTax Fought Free, Simple Tax
Filing (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-maker-of-turbotaxfought-free-simple-tax-filing [https://perma.cc/399J-PGVM] (describing how Intuit, the
maker of TurboTax, has spent millions lobbying against free, simple, government-filed tax
returns).
135. See Kellen Funk, Chapter 5: The Swearer’s Prayer: Oathtaking and Witness
Testimony 17 (May 12, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3599032
[https://perma.cc/HJ8S-CYW9] (discussing New York State’s Field Code).
136. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
138. Interview with Judge 1, Plainville.
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Our interview data reflect that the judges, advocates, and other actors
involved in these dockets are well aware of litigants’ social needs and that
court’s dispute resolution design does not fit these needs. One judge put
it plainly: “So, we’d find a lot of people in [protective order court] really
needed to be in [landlord–tenant], or sometimes, bills, financial planning,
is what they need, not family court.”139 An advocate drew the contrast
between the assumptions about these cases and the reality:
[Y]ou would think that literally every case in [protective order]
court was a man beating a woman with a bat, but that couldn’t be
further from the truth . . . . [T]hat’s not at all what we see in
[protective order] court. We’ve represented a sister versus her
brother. We’ve represented an elderly parent, a grandmother
versus a younger nephew who was trying to get the upper hand
in [a] probate case. We’ve represented a tenant where the petitioner was an abusive, mentally ill landlord.”140
When state civil courts are faced with social needs, they must respond
in some way. Our data show that these responses fall into four categories.
We discuss these categories to frame a deeper theoretical understanding
of the role of state civil courts and acknowledge that these categories raise
new questions. For example, how do these responses appear across jurisdictions and case types? Why might one court avoid social needs while
another attempts to meet them? What disposes a court system to build new
institutions in the face of these needs? We hope future work will address
these questions.141
In the first type of response, courts avoid social needs presented by
the litigant. They either do this altogether or by shaping the needs to fit
the design of the legal system. This type of court response reveals the
potential for state civil courts to be violent actors in the face of the
mismatch between social need and dispute resolution. In the second category, courts try to meet litigants’ social needs at the individual actor level.
What this means in the courtroom is not that courts are acting as agents
of social provision in a social welfare state, but rather that courts address
the social needs of litigants just enough to resolve the dispute as wedged
into the institutional design—and hopefully to keep litigants from returning to court again. The third category is where courts develop informal
139. Interview with Judge 1, Centerville.
140. Interview with Court Actor 1, Centerville.
141. One particular area for further investigation is when statutes creating courts or
specific areas of jurisdiction acknowledge or allow for engagement with broader litigant
needs. For instance, a New York statute provides:
This act defines the conditions on which the family court may intervene
in the life of a child, parent and spouse. Once these conditions are satisfied, the court is given a wide range of powers for dealing with the
complexities of family life so that its action may fit the particular needs of
those before it. The judges of the court are thus given a wide discretion
and grave responsibilities.
N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 141 (McKinney 2022).
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procedures to address social needs at an institutional level. A final category
of court response is where courts develop new institutions to meet social
needs.
A.

Avoid Social Needs

When courts avoid the social needs that arise in the courtroom,
despite a litigant’s social need that is plainly within the frame of the case
or revealed by the underlying facts, the court hews to its design as a site of
dispute resolution. At a minimum, this means the litigant’s need is ignored
and not met. Sometimes the litigant’s need is distorted by dispute resolution so that the outcome of the case is that the litigant needs more or different social provision. In other cases, as we discuss below, the court’s
avoidance leads to the court imposing a violent outcome, such as the loss
of a home or a child.
In the protective order discussed above, brought by a grandmother
against her mentally ill daughter who was jeopardizing her visitation, the
grandmother told the judge that what she wanted was to get her daughter
into court-ordered treatment. The judge cut oﬀ her testimony, entered a
protective order, and ended the hearing.142 In doing so, the judge was
avoiding the social need articulated by the grandmother and hewing to
the legal definition of the dispute as defined by domestic violence law. In
another case, a mother sought a protective order against a daughter who
kept trying to break into her home to get food. The testimony revealed
that the daughter was mentally ill and addicted to drugs. In the mother’s
words, “Her mind is gone. She thinks she lived there. She can’t do it. She
hasn’t lived there since February.” The judge entered a protective order.
In response, the mother asked whether the daughter could receive
treatment. The judge told her, “You can file with [another court] to admit
her to treatment, but it’s going to be expensive. The police can bring her
to crisis, maybe they can care for her there. That’s the key word, crisis
treatment.” The judge then ended the hearing with the protective order
in place.143 Despite explicitly understanding the social need in each of
these cases (here, mental health or addiction care), the court proceeded
with the matter as one of dispute resolution.
Courts do not just avoid the need for social provision; they also
compound it by entering protective orders. Each of these petitioners
presented a respondent’s social need, requested some kind of social
provision, but each court avoided those needs and then added a layer of
risk of even more punitive consequences for the respondents’ behavior.144
142. See Notes of Hearing 21, Plainville ( Judge 1); supra note 128 and accompanying
text.
143. Notes of Hearing 8, Townville ( Judge 4).
144. There are also examples of cases where judges avoid the social need and decline
to enter protective orders. See Notes of Hearing 18, Centerville ( Judge 1) (recounting proceedings in which a petitioner sought, but was ultimately denied, a protective order against
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In each of these cases, by avoiding the underlying need of health care and
imposing the legal solution of a protective order, the court facilitates
violent state action—here, the respective daughters are now subject to
arrest and incarceration if they violate the protective orders.145
In another example from our data, the plaintiﬀ and respondent were
two women who reached an agreement to resolve the matter through a
mandatory prehearing mediation program.146 They appeared before the
judge to enter the corresponding order. The hearing is four minutes long:
Judge:
I see you’ve come to agreement which is
good. But it’s important that you stick with
the agreement. The court finds that it has
jurisdiction, and that Respondent agrees
without admitting allegations to entry of this
order. For next year, don’t harass, assault,
threaten, or stalk. Also, Respondent shall
follow all treatment recommendations from
her mental health provider, including
medications. That is a critical component.
Judge:
(To Respondent) Is that your signature? Did
you sign it voluntarily?
Respondent:
Yes (speaks angrily).
Judge:
One last thing. I have no reason to believe you
have a gun but I must read this. [Judge reads
standard prohibition regarding possession of
firearm].
Respondent:
(To Petitioner, while the judge is speaking): See
what you do?
Judge:
(The Judge ignores the Respondent.) Any
questions?
Respondent:
No.
Judge:
I hope this order will help and that you’ll
continue to see your doctor and take your
meds.
his nephew who has uncontrolled schizophrenia and had violent outbursts while living with
him).
145. See generally Nat’l Ctr. on Prot. Ords. & Full Faith & Credit, Protection Order
Violations
Matrix
(2015),
https://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/ncpoﬀcprotection-order-violations-matrix.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X93-BYTG] (summarizing consequences for violations of protection orders in all fifty states); Plain-Language Legal
Information for Victims of Abuse, WomensLaw.org, https://www.womenslaw.org
[https://perma.cc/4JVE-YY97] (last visited Mar. 3, 2022) (including an interactive legal
information tool summarizing statutes in each state).
146. Notes of Hearing 35, Centerville ( Judge 1). Because the case is filtered through
the mediation program, we do not know how the parties presented their needs or case to
the court.
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In this jurisdiction, there is a required meeting with a mediator before
a hearing—a step generally perceived as an innovation that mitigates the
rigidity of the adversarial system.147 Yet the litigants’ problems remained
social needs, and the court resolved them as a dispute. Even in a fourminute, perfunctory hearing to enter the agreed-upon resolution, the
mismatch between the social needs and the court’s design is stark. The
judge’s closing comment acknowledged the mismatch and the court’s
choice to hew to its dispute resolution design, even with an “alternative”
resolution procedure in place.
Our study site is not the exclusive context for courts avoiding social
needs. Eviction courts are classic examples. The most straightforward
version of this is when a tenant cannot pay rent because of insuﬃcient
income, and the housing court evicts the tenant.148 Other eviction causes
of action are for tenant behavior such as disruptive noise or fighting. These
cases reveal social needs including mental health care and caregiving
support in housing court. Where a court does not outright evict a tenant,
the case is often resolved by agreement where the tenant promises to
comply with certain additional financial or behavioral conditions. These
outcomes allow courts to avoid the social needs presented and, as
Professor Nicole Summers shows, create an additional mechanism of
control over tenants, often leading to more “swift and certain” eviction.149
These cases distort litigants’ social needs, not by meeting and eliminating
them but by compounding the original needs by making the tenant more
vulnerable to the violence of eviction.
The examples above are ones where the litigants are private parties.
This type of distortion also occurs where the government is a party to a
case. For example, in the child welfare context, a mother may be
defending an action brought by the government for abuse or neglect
because of the poor living conditions of the family. In this circumstance,
the mother needs better housing (or other social provision that would
allow her to aﬀord better housing) yet the dispute brought to court by the
government is not to comprehensively address the underlying social
147. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 24, at 36 (describing mediation as an “[i]ntermediate space[] . . . without formal or complexly facilitated rules”); Jane Murphy, Rethinking
the Role of Courts in Resolving Family Conflicts, 21 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 625, 634–35
(2020) (describing the role of mediation in family law generally).
148. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, supra note 7, at 64–66 (collecting
sources regarding underlying economic inequality of housing courts).
149. Nicole Summers, Civil Probation, 75 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript
at 7), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3897493 [https://perma.cc/7NAA-Z6QH]. Professor
Summers has shown how the outcomes of these cases are often settlements crafted to control
tenant behavior rather than resolution of disputes regarding the housing agreement. Id.;
see also Carolyn Reinach Wolf & Jamie A. Rosen, Alternatives to Eviction: Legal Remedies
When Faced With a Mentally Ill Tenant, 48 N.Y. Real Prop. L.J. 14, 15–17 (2020) (suggesting
that rather than evicting tenants who struggle with mental health—which can present problems for both tenants and landlords—landlords should pursue alternative options like
guardianship, assisted outpatient treatment, or temporary hospitalization and care).
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need.150 In cases where the government has an active role, the mismatch
between dispute resolution and social needs is even more complex
because it is not just that government services are inadequate, but rather
that the government’s role compounds the absence of social provision
with a violent remedy, here the loss of a child.
B.

Attempt to Meet Social Needs

A second category of court response to litigants’ social needs is to try
to meet those needs. For analytic clarity, this category captures when actors
connect litigants with resources but not when actors create new
institutional structures to provide those resources.
In our data, these attempts to meet social needs vary. One way judges
try to meet social needs is to not resolve the matter in their own court but
to instead send a litigant to a court the judge perceives as better able to
meet the litigant’s need. For example, judges can dismiss or stay the
protective order case and tell litigants to go to another court to address
their needs, including telling litigants to go to family court for custody
matters,151 to family court to force the co-parent into alcohol treatment,152
or to landlord–tenant court.153 An example from our data is a case where
the litigants were roommates who got into a fistfight. The roommates had
been placed together by a social services program and each had
underlying mental health diagnoses and a history of housing instability.154
During the hearing, the judge recognized these needs for social provision,
stayed the case, and referred each party to mental health treatment
resources and a housing counseling center to identify potential alternative
housing. Setting aside the procedural choice to stay the case, which we
150. See
Maren
K.
Dale,
Addressing
the
Underlying
Issue
of
Poverty
in
Child-Neglect
Cases,
A.B.A.
(Apr.
10,
2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrens-rights/articles/
2014/addressing-underlying-issue-poverty-child-neglect-cases/ [https://perma.cc/F9G2F4QA] (citing a Tennessee case in which the state brought an action to terminate the
parental rights of a poor family with a disabled mother and low-IQ father, with a judge
dissenting on the grounds that while the state should have custody, the parents’ rights
should not have been terminated); see also Marta Beresin, Reporting Homeless Parents for
Child Neglect: A Case Study From Our Nation’s Capital, 18 UDC L. Rev. 14, 16 (2015)
(“[T]he D.C. Department of Human Services and Child and Family Services Agency’s policy
of reporting homeless families for neglect rather than assisting them with shelter or housing
is both financially irresponsible and counter to the fundamental goals of the child welfare
system.”).
151. Notes of Hearing 7, Townville ( Judge 4) (denying the protective order); Notes of
Hearing 14, Townville ( Judge 2) (denying the protective order and telling litigants “family
issues need to be resolved on the family division docket”).
152. Notes of Hearing 35, Plainville ( Judge 1) (staying the protective order proceeding
so petitioner can file in family court).
153. Notes of Hearing 5, Townville ( Judge 2) (“Let me tell you something. I’m not
involved with the landlord-tenant dispute. Let her come get her stuﬀ. Don’t have contact.
I’m not getting involved in it. I’m dissolving both [protective orders].”).
154. Id. at 24.
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discuss below in the context of informal procedure, this is a classic
example of a state civil court actor trying to meet a social need. The
diﬀerence in these examples from those where courts avoid social needs
is that the judge is choosing not to impose the dispute resolution design
of protective order law on the social needs but rather to only engage the
underlying need.
Another variation is when judges tell litigants to try to access social
services or benefits outside the courts. For example, a judge denied a
protective order for a mother who was living in a shelter after leaving the
home where the father lived, telling her to file for Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families and welfare benefits so that the government would
then seek child support from the father.155 This is particularly true in
jurisdictions like Centerville, where funding ties access to housing,
services, and victim compensation to a party having a protective order.156
In this circumstance, judges can attempt to meet social needs by granting
a protective order and informing litigants of the resources they can then
access. Finally, sometimes courts will directly order social provision. For
example, a judge entered a protective order for a sister against her brother
who was addicted to drugs and ordered the brother to complete a drug
treatment program.157 In these instances of courts attempting to meet
social needs, they introduced an element of state control that was not
previously present. While the brother in this instance then had access to
drug treatment, he also was subject to punishment––including financial
penalty and incarceration—if he failed to comply with the order. When
courts try to meet social needs, whether inside or outside courtrooms, they
can introduce an element of state control that was not previously present
in a way that is similar to critiques of the state as a party in civil matters.158
C.

Create Law or Procedure

A third response to the mismatch between social needs and dispute
resolution design is for individual actors to create informal law or
procedure to meet social needs. This is a diﬀuse phenomenon and
captures behavior that ranges from a court clerk’s behavior in an
individual case to informal practices shared among judges in the same
court.159 What distinguishes this phenomenon in state civil courts from
155. Notes of Hearing 9, Townville ( Judge 4).
156. Interview with Court Actor 3, Centerville.
157. Notes of Hearing 12, Townville ( Judge 2).
158. See supra notes 131–133.
159. One of us has written about this “ad hoc judging” as a judicial coping mechanism
for resolving disputes in lawyerless courts. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 8, at
898–99; see also Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
767, 774 (2017) (“Ad hoc procedure overcomes problems that cannot be solved using the
existing procedural structures, and may be necessary to ensure that the civil justice system
is able to provide the ordinary desiderata of civil litigation in cases that defy customary
judicial management.”).
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traditional theories of law development is that this phenomenon is unseen
on a systemic level. This is in part because of the limited development of
written law in lawyerless courts.160 For the purposes of this analysis, we are
interested in the subset of this informal law or procedure that shifts courts’
institutional goal from dispute resolution to social provision.
Drawing on our data, one way courts do this is by shaping law to meet
litigant needs within the confines of dispute resolution. For example, a
protective order matter was brought by an uncle against a nephew with
newly diagnosed schizophrenia who had been violent with the uncle. After
a hearing and evidentiary findings that the petitioner had met his burden,
the judge sua sponte added petitioner’s husband as a party to the
protective order. The husband had not sought such an order, had not
presented evidence in support of one, and the law regarding who could
seek such an order (based on the nature of the parties’ relationship, past
incidents between them, and fear of future harm) had not been engaged
at all. Yet the judge decided that the respondent’s mental illness was such
that both the uncle and his husband should be protected and implicitly
created law to provide for that.161
Judges also develop new remedies outside the written law to meet
litigant needs or disregard written law to the same end. For example, in
one case the judge declared, without any request or question from the
petitioner, “I’ll waive monetary relief because you don’t want contact,” yet
there is no definition of these two remedies that makes them mutually
exclusive.162 In another case with cross-petitions by co-parents, the judge
asked the clerk in open court, “I want them to go to a custody parenting
seminar—can I do that if it’s a dismissal? Can I order that onto the Family
Division docket?” The clerk got on the phone, called someone else to ask
the same question, then told the judge that “they will put it in the system.”
The judge then dismissed the case and said “there’s an order to go to the
custody parenting seminar” and told the parties to go to the custody and
support oﬃce in the courthouse.163 This example is distinct from a pure
referral to another court because this judge created jurisdictional law
allowing a remedy where, despite dismissing the case on one docket, the
judge entered an order on a diﬀerent case between the parties on another
judge’s docket.
In another matter involving a dispute between a grandmother and a
grandson over the costs of her care (which the grandson had taken from
the grandmother’s funds), the judge articulated a distinction between
160. Green, supra note 112, at 1307 (noting that much of the law actually applied in
small claims court is informal and diverges from the written statutes, and thus arguing for
the injection of legal standards); Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development, supra note 11
(discussing the disproportionately limited development of law and precedent in “lower status courts”).
161. Notes of Hearing 18, Centerville ( Judge 1).
162. Notes of Hearing 12, Townville ( Judge 2).
163. Id. at 26.
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what he “can” do and what he “can’t” do. He “can” ask the grandson to
return all the money he took except for the already paid for expenses, but
he “can’t” consider what the expenses were and what should be
returned.164 There is no substantive law, evidentiary rule, or procedure
that aligns with this articulation by the judge; the judge simply created a
new legal distinction. At the end of the same hearing, after the judge
decided not to issue a protective order, the grandmother said she didn’t
want the grandson near her, to which the judge responded, “[H]e’s on
notice, you can call the cops.” But, in the absence of a protective order,
there is no legal remedy that flows from calling the police. Though our
data do not capture any subsequent interactions with the police, one
wonders whether the grandmother ever tried to do this and whether the
police in fact acted consistent with the remedy suggested by the judge.
Regardless, this is also an example of courts as violent actors, where the
judge’s articulated remedy introduced the potential for police
intervention and the grandson’s arrest, even in the absence of a protective
order, if the grandson went to the grandmother’s house.
Judges also explicitly create new procedure. As Professors Pamela
Bookman and David Noll have theorized, in contrast to traditional
procedure developed in advance of disputes by legislative action, ad hoc
procedure is developed in the midst of a matter in controversy to achieve
specific outcomes.165 Our data are replete with examples of this behavior,
by judges but also occasionally by other actors.166 In the example of
roommates with mental health and housing needs discussed above, the
judge decided to stay the case for ninety days to allow the litigants to access
services.167 There is no law or procedure in this jurisdiction about a
continuance to seek social services, nor did the parties request a stay.
Nonetheless, the judge recognized that the litigants were less in need of
dispute resolution by the court and more in need of services outside the
court and improvised a procedure to accommodate their needs.
In another example, a defendant had not been served with notice of
the protective order matter. In this jurisdiction, petitioners can ask the
police department to serve, and this petitioner had done so, but the police
had not accomplished service. As a result, even though the petitioner
appeared for her hearing, the judge could not proceed. Visibly frustrated
by the ongoing delays, the judge asked if the petitioner knew how to
contact the defendant and the petitioner said she had the defendant’s
phone number. In open court, and without any written procedure that
allows such an approach to service, the judge used her speakerphone to
dial the defendant, who picked up the phone:

164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 23.
Bookman & Noll, supra note 159, at 767–68.
Steinberg et al., Judges and Deregulation, supra note 9, at 1316.
Notes of Hearing 24, Townville ( Judge 2).
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Judge:

This is Judge [Two], we’re on the record in
[Townville] court. Are you aware of the
restraining order?
Defendant:
Yes.
Judge:
Are you aware you need to be in court?
Defendant:
I thought it was tomorrow . . . .
Judge:
All I want to know is will you be in court?
Defendant:
YesJudge:
At 8:30 at [Townville] court.
Defendant:
Yes, I will be there.
Judge:
We got no letters, nothing, none of it means
anything. Be here at 8:30. You’re served.
Then the judge hung up the phone.168 In addition to the sheer human
drama of this judge-created procedure, this example is remarkable
because this jurisdiction’s law does not allow for service by phone.
Our data also reveal ad hoc procedure created by a clerk or by the
judge’s reliance on a clerk’s advice, often in response to questions about
how to meet social needs. One variation on this is when clerks give
instructions to litigants oﬀ the record. For example, in Townville, the
clerks were trained specifically in protective order procedure in a way the
judges were not. They were also physically seated between the door to the
courtroom and the bench and litigant tables. As a matter of course, we
observed litigants approach clerks to ask questions and the clerks tell
litigants to adjust what they had written on a form or to go to a diﬀerent
location for mediation or to access a service. On the record across the
jurisdictions in our study, judges would ask clerks what a procedural rule
was, and the clerks’ responses were not always in line with the law.169 A
related phenomenon appears in judges’ reliance on nonlawyer advocates
in court adjacent programs, which we discuss in a separate paper.170 For
example, a judge might interrupt a formal court hearing to “ask [an
advocate] . . . to call the [pro se] person and maybe have them come in
and amend something.”171
Another example in our data is in protective order cases with related
housing issues. Here, protective order judges in our data dispose of the
landlord–tenant matter without any law or procedure providing that a
protective order controls the housing question. In our data, this
168. Id. at 13.
169. See id. at 16 (waiving a civil penalty on a clerk’s initiative and asking if there is
anything else the judge needs to do); Notes of Hearing 35, Plainville ( Judge 1) (relying on
a clerk’s statement that family court cases will be consolidated to stay a protective order).
Interviews confirmed that judges relied on clerks to make procedural choices. Interview with
Court Actor 3, Plainville.
170. Steinberg et al., Judges and Deregulation, supra note 9, at 1328 (“Judges are quietly
collaborating with a network of nonlawyer advocates who carefully curate protective
petitions, develop facts and evidence, counsel pro se petitioners, and influence the judge’s
performance in court and, presumably, the outcome of cases.”).
171. Interview with Court Actor 2, Plainville.

1512

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1471

sometimes happens without any inquiry as to whether there is a pending
housing court matter.172 Judges are eﬀectively creating law that allows their
decisions to preempt a housing court matter. This could be seen as
avoiding a social need by avoiding the underlying housing law questions
and issues by summarily disposing of the housing issue. It also could be
seen as addressing a social need by meeting an underlying housing need
for one party.
D. Create New Institutions
A final version of courts’ reactions to litigants’ needs is the most
explicit structural change: creating new institutions that attempt to
provide for social needs. This captures a range of institutional innovation,
but the hallmark is that it is court actors creating new institutions outside
the normal modes of dispute resolution.
Sometimes the new institution is adjacent to the courtroom. This is
the case in the protective order cases that are the subject of our study,
where domestic violence organizations operate as separate institutions but
are integrated into procedure in formal and informal ways. For example,
in Townville, before a petitioner can agree to dismiss a case, they must
meet with a domestic violence advocate to review information about
protective order procedure (a type of legal counseling) and domestic
violence generally (a type of social work counseling). Once this happens,
the petitioner appears before the judge who does a formal colloquy about
whether this counseling has happened. In this jurisdiction, the advocates
are judicial branch employees who themselves do not provide social
services but are robustly equipped to refer petitioners to outside
organizations and do so as a matter of course. They are the same parties
who assist petitioners in filling out initial requests for protective orders at
the start of the process.173 Eﬀectively, the state civil court in this jurisdiction
has built a new court structure within the judicial branch: an oﬃce that
provides counseling and assistance within the civil process that petitioners
are required to engage with if they wish to achieve certain outcomes in the
dispute resolution process.
In Plainville, the domestic violence advocates are employees of a
separate nonprofit entity but have oﬃces in the courthouse and are
present in the courtroom for every protective order hearing. The judges
172. An advocate for respondents in Centerville told us:
If I’m a landlord and I live with my tenant, I can just get a [protective
order] and get you out. It supersedes landlord-tenant law . . . . [I]t
shouldn’t if there’s an active landlord tenant case. But unless the respondent brings it up and it is aﬃrmatively raised, [the] judge isn’t aware that
there’s a landlord tenant case. Judges only deal with what’s before them
and what they’ve been told by parties. So they just put the [protective
order] into eﬀect and then the tenant has to get out.
Interview with Court Actor 1, Centerville.
173. Interview with Court Actor 1, Townville.
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send petitioners to them as a matter of course for assistance with their
cases, and the advocates explicitly understand their role to be to connect
litigants with social services.174 Here, advocates are separate from the court,
but litigants likely do not perceive that distinction. And while formal
procedure does not require petitioners to engage with them, the judges’
instructions are functionally a requirement.
In Centerville, the domestic violence advocates are a robust part of
the judicial branch, actively provide social services, and are also legal
advocates before the court on particular cases and on systemic matters.175
This jurisdiction is the most complete exercise of institution building, as
the new institution wields meaningful power in the court ecosystem. This
is true in direct interactions with petitioners, where the adjacent domestic
violence advocate institution eﬀectively controls access to social services
and funding for petitioners, which are conditioned on the presence of a
protective order.176 In contrast, Centerville does not oﬀer these same
resources to respondents. The presence of resources and services for
petitioners has led to eﬀorts to even this imbalance, including the
formation of a respondent advocacy organization whose origin includes
the recognition that respondents were losing their housing because of the
de facto preemption of eviction proceedings by protective order
proceedings.177 It has also become true in terms of political power in this
jurisdiction, where this newly created institution is consulted about
institutional questions of the court, including legislation.178
In protective order cases, the proliferation of these institutions is a
direct result of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which provides
federal funding for assistance to petitioners in these cases.179 The
institutional development that has resulted from these choices, however,
is a matter of state and local control.180 The same advocacy organizations
that are part of local institution building in state civil courts are also
advocating for federal funding for these institutions. This institutional

174. Interview with Judge 1, Plainville.
175. Steinberg et al., Judges and Deregulation, supra note 9, at 1330.
176. Interview with Court Actor 3, Centerville; Follow-up Telephone Interview with
Court Actor 3, Centerville.
177. Interview with Court Actor 1, Centerville.
178. Id.
179. See OVW Grants and Programs, DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/ovw/grant-programs (listing nineteen grant programs funded by VAWA) [https://perma.cc/P3PK-HLS7]
(last updated Sept. 8, 2021).
180. See Oﬃce on Violence Against Women (OVW): About the Oﬃce, DOJ,
https://www.justice.gov/ovw/about-oﬃce [https://perma.cc/EGG9-NPG8] (last updated
Mar. 16, 2022) (“[VAWA] [f]unding is awarded to local, state and tribal governments, courts,
non-profit organizations, [and] community-based organizations . . . to develop eﬀective
responses to violence against women through activities that include direct services, . . . court
improvement, and training for law enforcement and courts.”).
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development is a line of research unto itself.181 For purposes of this
discussion, each of these examples is one in which the social needs
presented in state civil court spurred the development of new institutions,
sited in the court to diﬀering degrees, to meet the needs that courts’
dispute resolution design fails to address.
We can see this phenomenon in other types of cases. For example, in
Philadelphia, a local mortgage foreclosure diversion program began in
2008 (building on work begun in 2004). This program was spearheaded
by court leadership and administered by a combination of judges, clerks,
pro bono attorneys (acting as both advocates for homeowners and as
mediators), financial counselors, and legal services providers. It required
a prehearing conference between homeowners and lenders that was
supplemented by court and legal assistance at first and ultimately by access
to state and federal subsidies.182 One study of this program includes an
example that identifies the homeowners’ underlying social needs beyond
housing. In this case, the homeowner refinanced her mortgage to “settle
credit card debts while taking care of a disabled mom, a niece, and a
nephew.”183 This institutional development is the predecessor to the
current eviction diversion program in Philadelphia (and similar ones
around the country).184
This institution building also captures what have been dubbed “civil
problem-solving courts.” As one of us has discussed in depth, “outside of
family law matters, the problem-solving model has barely cracked the civil
sphere.”185 Problem-solving courts originated in the criminal justice
181. For example, is the VAWA example unique or indicative of the history and potential for the relationship between federal funding and state civil court innovation? Do the
court-based actors responsible for these institutions see themselves as expanding courts? As
bringing social services into courts? As oﬄoading social needs to an institution that is extrajudicial? What is the historical and political perspective on the evolution of these
institutions?
182. The Reinvestment Fund, Philadelphia Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Diversion
Program: Initial Report of Findings 3 (2011), https://www.reinvestment.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/Foreclosure_Diversion_Initial_Report-Report_2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L8C4-MTRN].
183. Id. at 15.
184. See Reinvestment Fund, Words From the Field: Practitioner Perspectives on Eviction Process Improvements in Philadelphia 14 (2021), https://www.reinvestment.com/wpcontent/uploads/2022/02/ReinvestmentFund_Brief-_PHL-Eviction-Process-Improvements.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9HFB-QN5R] (describing Philadelphia’s “Eviction Diversion Program,”
which “requires landlords to apply for emergency rental assistance and participate in
mediation prior to filing an eviction case in Municipal Court”); Michaelle Bond, Philly’s
Program for Preventing Evictions Is a National Model. Lawmakers Want to Make It
Permanent., Phila. Inquirer (Dec. 8, 2021), https://www.inquirer.com/realestate/housing/rental-assistance-philadelphia-eviction-diversion-program-20211208.html
[https://perma.cc/CD43-CEA2].
185. Jessica K. Steinberg, A Theory of Problem-Solving Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1579,
1582 (2019); see also Douglas B. Marlowe, Carolyn D. Hardin & Carson L. Fox, Nat’l Drug
Ct. Inst., Painting the Current Picture: A National Report on Drug Courts and Other
Problem-Solving Courts in the United States 7, 9, 12 (2016) (explaining how as of 2016,
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context and carry with them a host of challenges related to government
coercion and control.186 These same concerns are well-described in the
family law context and others.187 In child welfare cases, problem solving
courts are championed “as a place where a team of professionals led by
the judge can provide a range of assistance,” but as Professor Jane Spinak
tells us, “If courts are not recognized as instruments of coercion and
control but as places to solve problems, there is a [destructive] domino
eﬀect on families, particularly vulnerable families.”188 Research shows that
situating assistance within courts diminishes funding for upstream public
health and harm-reduction interventions at lower cost.189
In the broader civil context, these are “new” courts, designed to
address a particular type of case or collection of claims in the existing
system using a new configuration of roles or resources.190 For example, one
there were nearly 3,000 drug courts, as well as more than 1,000 problem-solving courts
devoted to various issues, including mental health, reentry, domestic violence, veterans’s
aﬀairs, and homelessness).
186. Bach, supra note 132, at 828 (citing a “worry that problem-solving courts inevitably
draw social welfare resources out of communities and voluntary settings and into inevitably
coercive courts”); see also Richard Abel, Introduction, in 1 The Politics of Informal Justice:
The American Experience 1, 5 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (describing how informal
processes are cheap and thus permit an enormous expansion of control); Stacy Lee
Burns, The Future of Problem-Solving Courts: Inside the Courts and Beyond, 10 U. Md. L.J.
Race Religion Gender & Class 73, 84 (2010) (“[W]elfare-oriented sentencing alternatives
create the risk of net widening, expanding the scope, breadth, depth and duration of government monitoring and control over the lives of citizens . . . .”); Amy J. Cohen, Trauma
and the Welfare State: A Genealogy of Prostitution Courts in New York, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 915,
947–51 (2017) (“[T]he primary business of informal institutions is social control[,] . . .
[which] expand[s] the reach of the state into the lives of the poor and marginalized through
discourses of care.”); Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 Stan. L. & Pol’y
Rev. 417, 425 (2009) (arguing that the therapeutic methodology adopted by courts “cannot
address social features of urban drug use that have an economic and racial impact”);
Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Community Courts, 10
Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 63, 91–92 (2002) (“[C]ommunity residents may prefer to resolve issues
without the threat of the criminal justice system hanging in the balance.”).
187. Aya Gruber, Amy J. Cohen & Kate Mogulescu, Penal Welfare and the New Human
Traﬃcking Intervention Courts, 68 Fla. L. Rev. 1333, 1382–83 (2016); Corey Shdaimah, Taking a Stand in a Not-So-Perfect World: What’s a Critical Supporter of Problem-Solving Courts
to Do?, 10 U. Md. L.J. Race Religion Gender & Class 89, 103–04 (2010); Jane M. Spinak, A
Conversation About Problem-Solving Courts: Take 2, 10 U. Md. L.J. Race Religion Gender
& Class 113, 119–24 (2010).
188. Jane M. Spinak, Family Defense and the Disappearing Problem-Solving Court, 20
CUNY L. Rev. 171, 175–76 (2016).
189. See Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12
Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 590, 619–25 (2005) (discussing cost eﬃciency of community-based
preventative programs); Cynthia Godsoe, Just Intervention: Diﬀerential Response in Child
Protection, 21 J.L. & Pol’y 73, 82–88 (2012) (discussing the eﬀectiveness and value of community-based organizations in diﬀerential response programs).
190. See Marvin S. Swartz & Jeﬀrey W. Swanson, Mandated Community Treatment in
Services for Persons With Mental Illness, in The Palgrave Handbook of American Mental
Health Policy 171, 176, 179–82 (Howard H. Goldman, Richard G. Frank & Joseph P.
Morrissey eds., 2020) (discussing civil court procedures governing compulsory community
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of us has written about the District of Columbia’s Housing Conditions
Court and its inquisitorial model of judicially controlled investigation and
enforcement of housing code violations by landlords.191 In this example, a
single judge hears all housing condition complaints by tenants, has a
dedicated investigator who goes to the property to investigate and
substantiate the presence of violations, and then uses both inquisitorial
courtroom processes and the investigator to enforce ongoing compliance
with the court’s disposition.192 Another example is in the Red Hook
Community Justice Center in New York, where a partnership between the
Center for Court Innovation (a nonprofit) and New York courts created a
neighborhood-based community court addressing housing cases.193 This
institution includes the actual civil housing docket, consisting of a
designated judge and a clerk who work in an integrated way with housing
advocates (who are hybrid employees of the nonprofit and the court) to
address housing problems and cases.194 In practice, this institutional
structure involves informal problem solving outside of court by the judge
and clerk to help litigants address underlying social needs, and active
participation by housing advocates within court processes to achieve the
same goal.195
III. A THEORY OF STATE CIVIL COURTS’ INSTITUTIONAL ROLE
With this fuller picture of social needs in state civil courts, how do
courts’ reactions to the mismatch between their dispute resolution design
and litigants’ social needs inform our institutional theories of state civil
courts? The four categories of court responses in the data—avoiding social
needs, meeting social needs, creating informal law and procedure, and
creating new institutions—give us two core theoretical insights into state
civil courts as institutions. The first is that state civil courts can play the role
of violent actor when exercising their dispute resolution function and
either avoiding or meeting social needs. Less directly, state civil courts can
be violent actors through new law and institutions. The second is that
when we look at the diﬀuse, small-scale actions of state civil courts as a
collective phenomenon, we see that state civil courts are acting as
treatment for adults with debilitating psychiatric illnesses and the ethics of compulsory care
in a civil court context, arguing that properly targeted mandatory community treatment is
a less restrictive alternative to hospitalization or arrest, and challenging other institutional
criticisms).
191. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate, supra note 121.
192. Id. at 1064–69.
193. Cynthia G. Lee, Fred L. Cheesman, II, David B. Rottman, Rachel Swaner, Suvi
Lambson, Mike Rempel & Ric Curtis, Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., A Community Court Grows in
Brooklyn: A Comprehensive Evaluation of the Red Hook Community Justice Center 1
(2013),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0031/18967/11012013-red-hookfinal-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B82F-U73W].
194. Id.
195. Id.
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policymakers. In the absence of action by executive and legislative
branches to meet social needs and the absence of development of formal
law by the judicial branch, the collective actions of individual state civil
courts have become our social policy.
A.

Courts as Violent Actors

Professor Robert Cover told us that “[l]egal interpretive acts signal
and occasion the imposition of violence upon others: A judge articulates
her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom,
his property, his children, even his life.”196 Though scholars and
communities are now in active conversations about this violence, especially
in the context of policing, we have not fully engaged Professor Cover’s
insight as it relates to civil courts.197 Courts’ reactions to social needs
presented by litigants can transform courts into violent institutional actors,
whether through attempts to meet needs or to avoid them. Considering
state civil courts as violent actors also allows us to see the fluid boundary
between criminal and civil law that litigants themselves describe.198
There are important diﬀerences—including the explicitly legally
sanctioned tool of violence in the role of police—between theories and
activism around policing and criminal justice and our exploration of state
civil courts. There is also a direct parallel, however, to the premise of
policing and criminal justice, which is that the government is an
appropriate actor to promote “safety” as a replacement for private
violence. As violent actors in American society, courts are entangled in our
history of slavery and racism. A historical exposition of the path from
slavery to eviction (and other) courts is not the goal of our project, but
others are building a range of insights into these historical paths, and we

196. Cover, supra note 15, at 1601; see also Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 57 (1983).
197. Cf. Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2053, 2054 (1993) (expanding on Cover, observing that “judges conclude their work on a note of violence—a death
sentence, an incarceration, a compulsory wealth transfer,” and arguing that “once we
recognize [that] violence implicit . . . , we are poised to understand that judges . . . have . . .
a highly interested, partial perspective on law”). Building on Cover, Harry Schwirck argues
that law “determines and reflects what might be termed an economy of violence[,] . . .
play[ing] a central role in defining what a society will recognize as violence.” Harry
Schwirck, Law’s Violence and the Boundary Between Corporal Discipline and Physical
Abuse in German South West Africa, 36 Akron L. Rev. 81, 82 (2002).
198. Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 Iowa L. Rev.
1263, 1317 (2016) [hereinafter Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice] (observing
that respondents’ past negative experiences with the criminal justice system translate into
reluctance to seek help for civil justice problems); Lauren Sudeall, Integrating the Access
to Justice Movement, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 172, 172–73 (2019) (observing that individuals
tend not to distinguish between civil and criminal justice systems).

1518

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1471

hope that work continues in conversation with our deepening
examination of state civil courts.199
As Professor Sinnar has argued, the evolution of civil procedure can
be told as a story of state violence supplanting and formalizing private
violence.200 For example, eviction procedure in state civil court was a state
response to mitigate and regulate the private violence of landlord “selfhelp” or throwing a tenant out of a home without consistent notice or
process.201 But state intervention did not remove violence; rather, it
institutionalized and sanctioned it. This violent role of the state has
evolved in the face of rising inequality, with state-sanctioned removal of
people from their homes aﬀecting millions per year nationally and some
counties removing more than 15% of their residents from their homes.202
As is the story with many harmful government functions in recent years, it
includes the use of private eviction companies who inflict this violence in
the name of the state.203 Using the case categories from above, we can see
an analogous role of violence in cases where a state civil court action leads
to the government forcefully taking property, most notably foreclosure
and debt collection matters which can be executed forcibly through
garnishment, liens, and asset seizure.204
199. See, e.g., Deborah N. Archer, Transportation Policy and the Underdevelopment of
Black Communities, 106 Iowa L. Rev. 2125, 2127 (2021) (studying how transportation policy
has historically and currently been used to exploit and subjugate black communities);
Maeve Glass, Citizens of the State, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865, 869 (2018) (arguing that “in the
decades prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the lawyers who seized on the State Citizenship Clause of Article IV did so . . . by reframing the issue of American slavery from the
rights of a black person to the sovereignty of a free state”); Kellen Funk, “Let No Man Put
Asunder”: South Carolina’s Law of Divorce, 1895–1950, S.C. Hist. Mag., July–Oct. 2009, at
134.
200. Sinnar, supra note 16, at *1.
201. Id. at *3.
202. See supra note 94.
203. See Lillian Leung, Peter Hepburn & Matthew Desmond, Serial Eviction Filing: Civil
Courts, Property Management, and the Threat of Displacement, 100 Soc. Forces 316, 333,
337 (2021) (pointing to an example of “the many supplementary business oﬀerings that
facilitated evictions” and documenting the process of serial eviction filing, which threatens
tenants with displacement multiple times from the same address and aﬀects a population
broader than only those in poverty); see also Editorial Board, Philadelphia’s
Eviction
Process
Blindsides
Renters,
Phila.
Inquirer
(July
28,
2020),
https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/editorials/a/philadelphia-eviction-system-philly-renterstenants-blindsided-20200728.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the use of
private firms to execute evictions and detailing how tenants rarely receive notice of such
evictions).
204. See Laura Gottesdiener, The Great Eviction, Nation (Aug. 1, 2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/great-eviction/ (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing SWAT teams and armed police removing North Carolina and Atlanta
residents
from
their
homes
which
were
foreclosed
on);
George
Graham, Crowd Protests Eviction of Father, Son From Foreclosed Home in
Springfield’s Sixteen Acres (Photos, Video), Mass Live (May 25, 2017),
https://www.masslive.com/news/2017/05/watch_crowd_gathers_to_protest.html
[https://perma.cc/AC4M-YNJP]
(last
updated
Jan.
7,
2019)
(depicting
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Further, courts are well-theorized as violent actors in the child welfare
system.205 It is hard to conceive of a more violent state act than the removal
of a child from a parent, whether temporary (as in dependency or custody
proceedings) or permanent (as in termination of parental rights
proceedings). But the violence of state civil courts goes beyond a particular
order in a case. As Professor Roberts has vividly told us, the legal system’s
role inflicts deep, intersectional punishment on subordinated
communities and Black mothers in particular.206 Roberts describes how
the intersectional relationship between foster care and incarceration relies
on the history and societal stereotypes of reproductive regulation and
maternal irresponsibility to “make[] excessive policing by foster care and
prison seem necessary to protect children and the public from harm”207
and facilitates “[t]he simultaneous buildup and operation of the prison
and foster care systems.”208
In other areas of the law where the role of state civil courts was
intended to mitigate personal violence, the story is more complicated. Our
qualitative data illustrates this complexity. In domestic violence cases, the
explicit role of state civil courts is to protect one citizen from violence by
another citizen. Yet as our data show, some state civil courts have
responded to the complex needs of litigants by engaging services to meet
social needs—but in the context of social control.209 In our data, for
mortgage
foreclosure
eviction
in
Massachusetts);
Laurie
Udesky,
When
Foreclosure Threatens Elder-Care Homes, N.Y. Times (Apr. 17, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/us/18sﬀoreclose.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing a sheriﬀ conducting foreclosure on residential care facilities for the
elderly in California).
205. See Susan L. Brooks & Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice and Family Court Reform,
40 Fam. Ct. Rev. 453, 453 (2002) (“Poor and minority families, on the other hand, are
disproportionately compelled to appear before family court judges against their will. The
state coercively intervenes in their lives and orders them to submit to the court’s jurisdiction
because parents are charged with child maltreatment or children are charged with delinquency.”); Kristin Henning, Race, Paternalism, and the Right to Counsel, 54 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 649, 666 (2017) (pointing out the susceptibility of the “best interests” standard in child
welfare cases to biases based on race and class views); Cortney E. Lollar, Criminalizing
(Poor) Fatherhood, 70 Ala. L. Rev. 125, 131 (2018) (arguing that the child support system
disproportionately aﬀects poor men and showing that criminalization of failing to provide
financially for a biological child is grounded in antiquated moral judgments about fatherhood); Vivek Sankaran, Christopher Church & Monique Mitchell, A Cure Worse Than the
Disease? The Impact of Removal on Children and Their Families, 102 Marq. L. Rev. 1161,
1194 (2019) (arguing that the child removal process does not often employ proper vetting,
thus unnecessarily inflicting harm on children and their families); Shanta Trivedi, The
Harm of Child Removal, 43 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 523, 579–80 (2019) (“[I]n most
jurisdictions in America, courts fail to consider the trauma that children will suﬀer if they
are removed from their parents[,] . . . as there is no legal requirement that judges take this
information into account.”).
206. See Roberts, Systemic Punishment, supra note 131, at 1499–1500.
207. Id. at 1500.
208. Id. at 1476.
209. See supra notes 185–189 and accompanying text.
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example, by virtue of the legal construct of a protective order, failure to
engage in the oﬀered social provision (such as mental health treatment)
can subject a person to incarceration for failure to comply with terms of
the protective order.210 Ultimately, this approach places “care” in the
context of violence rather than replacing violence with care.211 A similar
phenomenon is captured by Professor Nicole Summers’s concept of civil
probation as a mechanism of control, advantaging landlords and
sanctioned by courts.212 In Professor Summers’s analysis of settlements in
eviction cases, she identifies the overwhelming presence of landlords who
use settlement agreements to impose additional terms on the social and
economic problems that arise in the underlying eviction matter.213 For
example, where a tenant fails to pay rent, the settlement agreement
imposes more burdensome obligations on payment going forward.214
Professor Summers identifies a similarly pervasive but broader
phenomenon of landlords using settlement agreements to more generally
impose greater controls on tenants, unrelated to the underlying claims for
eviction.215 For example, in an eviction for nonpayment, the settlement
agreement imposes stricter terms regarding the occupancy of the
property.216 All of these make tenants more vulnerable to losing their
homes with the imprimatur of the state.
The experience of court itself can also be violent. Professor Barbara
Bedzek’s rich description of housing court as “violence in the form of
spirit-murder” captures this phenomenon.217 It is more recently explained
by work examining trauma and the law. Research describes the
retraumatization of survivors of intimate partner violence in both civil and
criminal courts.218 Others have analyzed how civil court notions of

210. See supra note 145.
211. See Bach, supra note 132, at 814 (“[W]hen the law merges care and punishment,
it both draws more individuals into punitive institutions . . . and compromises the quality of
the care overall.”); Cohen, supra note 186, at 916–17 (“But we have not simply witnessed
the retrenchment of particular welfare state programs alongside the intensification of carceral ones. Today, the criminal justice system provides its own welfarist institutions.”).
212. Summers, supra note 149 (manuscript at 42).
213. See id. (manuscript at 3) (finding that “the majority of settlement agreements
impose a series of interlocking terms that amount to . . . civil probation”).
214. Id. (manuscript at 42).
215. See id. (manuscript at 42–43).
216. Id. (manuscript at 43).
217. Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor
Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 541 (1992) (citing Patricia Williams,
Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to
Racism, 42 U. Mia. L. Rev. 127 (1987)).
218. Negar Katirai, Retraumatized in Court, 62 Ariz. L. Rev. 81, 93 (2020) (surveying
advocates and finding that 83% of survivors reported retraumatization due to court
procedures and outcomes).
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adversarialism,
judicial
impartiality,
and
formalism
aﬀect
retraumatization.219
Sometimes the violence of state civil courts explicitly engages with the
violence of mass incarceration. This occurs largely as a penalty for
noncompliance with civil court orders. For example, a respondent subject
to a protective order is subject to arrest for violating the order or its
conditions (which, as discussed above, can include “care” such as a
mandated addiction program).220 As in Turner v. Rogers, a parent who fails
to pay child support can be incarcerated by a civil court.221 Research done
by Professors Lauren Sudeall and Sara Sternberg Greene shows us how
litigants experience this fluid boundary between civil and criminal law.222
Across the types of social needs presented in state civil courts, the
mismatch between these needs and courts’ dispute resolution design
exacerbates state civil courts’ violent role.
B.

Courts as Policymakers

Thus far, we have discussed state civil courts as a constellation of
institutions reacting to the mismatch between social needs and dispute
resolution. Taking a broader view of these reactions, we posit that courts
are functioning as policymaking bodies in three related ways. First, in
attempting to provide services to meet litigant needs, courts have
developed a patchy, underresourced role as a provider of social services.
These choices about resource allocation are appropriate for the other
branches of government, but courts have become de facto decisionmakers.
Second, in creating and changing law and procedure, courts are engaging
in ad hoc procedure and law development in ways that are not occasional
or exceptional but are collectively shaping law and policy. Third, in
creating new government institutions, courts are squarely performing the
work of the executive and legislative branches via individual experiments
without the benefit of experimentalism. Each of these policymaking roles
219. Id. at 101–07; see also Leigh Goodmark, Decriminalizing Domestic Violence 152
(2018) (“In order to minimize the trauma of incarceration it is also essential to enforce
measures intended to protect prisoners from violence.”); Alesha Durfee, “Usually It’s Something in the Writing”: Reconsidering the Narrative Requirement for Protection Order
Petitions, 5 U. Mia. Race & Soc. Just. L. Rev. 469, 482 (2015) (“However, the adversarial
nature of the legal system, in combination with complex and confusing bureaucratic procedures and untrained court staﬀ, may make the PO process an incredibly traumatizing
experience—even with the ‘right’ support and in the ‘right’ environment.”); Deborah
Epstein & Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’
Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399, 447–48 (2019) (“But
she is also hoping for validation of the harm she has endured—in other words, to have her
experience credited.”).
220. See generally Nat’l Ctr. on Prot. Ords. & Full Faith & Credit, supra note 145
(detailing the protective order laws in every state and the repercussions for violating them).
221. 564 U.S. 431, 435 (2011).
222. See Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, supra note 198; Sudeall, supra
note 198.
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for courts raises questions of legitimacy and rule of law, transparency and
focus on litigants, and quality of outcomes and experimentalism.
Ours is a diﬀerent conception of courts as policymakers than
scholarship typically explores. As a general matter, critiques of courts as
policymaking bodies exist in the context of represented, adversarial
litigation and the final, merit-based decisions that emerge from this
process. Scholars often criticize the idea of courts as policymakers—as
activist judges attempting to legislate from the bench.223 These criticisms
emphasize courts’ lack of accountability to the public.224 Other scholars
sharpen this critique, arguing that even agencies are more democratically
accountable than courts and thus are more legitimate policymaking
bodies.225 Some criticisms center on institutional competence of courts.226
223. For an overview of this critique, see Jack L. Landau, The Myth of Judicial Activism,
70 Or. St. Bar Bull. 26, 27 (2010) (arguing that “no one actually says what he or she means”
when criticizing “judicial activism” and describing three ways in which people perceive that
judges improperly use their power, including by assuming too much policymaking
authority); Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating From the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 185, 189 (2007) (tracking criticisms of courts as activist policymakers
and arguing some “legislating from the bench” is both inevitable and desirable); Paul
Gewirtz & Chad Golder, Opinion, So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. Times ( July 6, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/06/opinion/so-who-are-the-activists.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (noting that the term “activist judge” is loosely defined in the
public discourse, arguing that striking down acts of Congress is the most “activist” thing a
judge can do, and tallying how often Justices voted to overturn acts of Congress).
224. See generally Thomas L. Jipping, Legislating From the Bench: The Greatest Threat
to Judicial Independence, 43 S. Tex. L. Rev. 141, 158 (2001) (describing two “models of
judicial power,” judicial restraint and judicial activism, and arguing judicial activism threatens America’s independent judiciary); H. Lee Sarokin, Thwarting the Will of the Majority,
20 Whittier L. Rev. 171 (1998) (challenging criticisms of the judiciary as a policymaking
body); cf. Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 555,
555–56 (2010) (challenging two ways that Republicans use the term “judicial activism” and
arguing that “equating judicial activism with the refusal to show deference to elected oﬃcials is inconsistent with much of modern Republican politics” and “presupposes an
unsustainably sharp distinction between constitutional politics and constitutional law”). The
debates over judicial activism, of course, have often ugly political histories. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 148 (1989) (detailing the legislative branch’s attempts to
prevent federal courts from hearing cases involving challenges to state laws permitting
school prayers or state laws restricting access to abortions).
225. Agencies, even independent agencies, are typically viewed as more democratically
responsive than courts. See Michael A. Fitts, Retaining the Rule of Law in a Chevron World,
66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 355, 356–57 (1990) (asserting that agencies are “under the informal
control of either a democratically elected Congress or President”); Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2088 n.80 (1990) (“[T]he democratic pedigree of the agency is usually superior to that of the court.”).
226. See Eric Berger, Comparative Capacity and Competence, 2020 Wis. L. Rev. 215,
219–23 (collecting research discussing the comparative competence of courts to make policy determinations relative to legislatures and executives). This argument also features
prominently in legal process theory. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a
Globalizing Judicial System, 54 Duke L.J. 1143, 1149–50 (2005) (arguing for “institutional
settlement” within legal process theory, which looks at how society decided “that law should
allocate decisionmaking to the institutions best suited to decide particular questions, and
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Other scholars argue that policymaking is a legitimate enterprise for U.S.
courts, for example in prison reform227 and mass tort litigation.228 Some
scholars claim that this policymaking is unavoidable and discuss how
courts actually influence policy change.229 In light of “the expansion of
judicial review,” others call for elections of judges, formalizing their role
as policymakers.230 Other scholarship considers the role of the judiciary in
moderating the policymaking balance between the legislative and
executive branches. Scholars consider how the judiciary moderates the
separation of judicial and executive power.231 Some scholars argue that no
dominant institution exists among the various players in the federal
policymaking process; instead, “all governing institutions can have a clear
role in making public policy as well as enforcing and legitimizing it.”232
Rather than capturing (federal) courts playing a legislative
(congressional) role via interpretation of (federal) statutes, we are
theorizing a diﬀerent policymaking role of state civil courts. In this
formulation, state civil courts are acting in the void created by the failure
of the executive and legislative branches to meet people’s social needs.233
that the decisions arrived at by those institutions must then be respected by other actors in
the system”).
227. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern
State: How the Courts Reformed America’s Prisons 27–95 (1998) (arguing that
policymaking is a standard and legitimate function of modern courts, using prison reform
cases between 1965 and 1990 as an example of a high-water mark of U.S. judicial
policymaking).
228. Sandra Nichols Thaim, Carol Adaire Jones, Cynthia R. Harris & Samuel F. Koenig,
Courts as Policymakers: The Uneven Justice of Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, in Looking
Back to Move Forward: Resolving Health & Environmental Crises 133, 134–36 (2020) (noting that while mass tort law was inadequate to address the problem, the courts stepped in to
play a larger role after Congress did not step in).
229. See generally Robert M. Howard & Amy Steigerwalt, Judging Law and Policy:
Courts and the Policymaking in the American Political System (2012) (analyzing the role of
the Court in policymaking in seven distinct policy areas and exploring both how courts
interact with other branches of government and whether judicial policymaking is a form of
activist judging).
230. See Rachel Paine Caufield, The Curious Logic of Judicial Elections, 64 Ark. L. Rev.
249, 260 (2011) (arguing that “the nature of judicial power has changed, necessitating
popular control”).
231. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes
on Three Doctrines, 40 Law & Contemp. Probs. 46, 46 (1976) (discussing “three methods
that the courts have used or might use to curb executive policy-making and recall Congress
to a greater policy-making role”).
232. Making Policy, Making Law: An Interbranch Perspective 204 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb
Barnes eds., 2004).
233. Our analysis here builds on a range of earlier work exploring how, in the absence
of eﬀective structural solutions at the highest level, informal regimes develop. See, e.g.,
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
Colum. L. Rev. 458, 461–63 (2001) (describing the “interesting and complex regulatory
pattern” that has emerged, in which “normative elaboration occurs through a fluid, interactive relationship between problem solving and problem definition within specific
workplaces and in multiple other arenas, including but not limited to the judiciary”).
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And this activity is engaging the myriad within-case decisions that occur in
lawyerless courts.234 This policymaking activity maps onto the four versions
of courts’ institutional role described above and is complicated by its
diﬀuse and experimental nature. Each example of policymaking is
individualized, though there are themes across state civil courts that have
de facto become collective action.
Where courts shift their role to provide resources to meet litigants’
needs, the courts are squarely assuming the roles of the executive and
legislative branches in social provision. In some instances, courts are
providing social services, traditionally an executive branch function. In
other instances, courts behave like legislatures by deciding that a
particular type of service provision is necessary and dedicating court
system funding to this social provision. This captures those actions
described above as courts “attempting social provision,” such as the judges
in our data who order drug treatment programs for respondents. It also
captures those attempts at social provision that send litigants (with or
without coercion) to access social services provided or funded by other
branches of government. For example, when a court refers a litigant to a
housing support organization, that court is making policy choices about
who should use those services and ultimately how those services should be
funded. Across these examples, the judicial branch is playing a
policymaking role in how social services are created, funded, and
delivered. Embedded in each of these individualized choices are decisions
that collectively shape policy about social provision in a particular
jurisdiction and across cities and states.
At least state civil courts—even if in limited, ad hoc ways—are trying
to meet social needs in the face of stark inequality. Yet, this institutional
role is fraught. This state civil court role operates in the absence of
coherent or comprehensive resources. Sometimes this means a judge
makes cold referrals that may or may not result in actual assistance. Other
times, court actors are leveraging personal or institutional relationships to
try to achieve results for litigants in need of services. Our data reflect selfawareness by court actors about their limits in this ad hoc activity.235 Taken

234. Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8, at 530; Carpenter et al.,
“New” Civil Judges, supra note 22, at 257.
235. One judge told us:
[Y]ou do the best you can do to do the job you were selected to do. You
show up, you prepare, you set expectations for your courtroom, you try to
keep people safe, and you try to do justice. But I don’t know []that any
local judge would have the ability to answer that. Our courts have
changed. You didn’t have a protective order docket before. You have [DV
Agency] and family and children’s services, and they were set up to give
these people justice. We have a system in place to help people get to court,
the next step is what do you do for the defendants?
Interview with Judge 1, Plainville.
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together, this shift in institutional role is resource constrained,
institutionally limited, and inconsistent.
A second way of understanding state civil courts as policymakers is
where courts create or change law or procedure to meet litigants’ needs.
This is closer to the traditional scholarly conception of courts as
policymakers. However, the nature of the mismatch in state civil courts
makes this policymaking role diﬀerent from theories of federal courts. It
is also less transparent because almost all of this activity is unwritten.236 In
some circumstances, the court action to create unwritten law or procedure
comes in the face of an aﬃrmative choice by a legislature to not fund a
particular service. For example, in our data, Plainville is in a state which
has one of the weakest social safety nets in the country and ranks at or near
the bottom of many measures of states’ investments in social services,
health care, and economic supports.237 We see the consequences of this in
Plainville courts that are staying cases, dismissing cases, and sending cases
to other dockets to avoid harmful outcomes in the absence of these social
services. In other circumstances, state civil courts are acting in the face of
inactivity by the executive and legislative branches. An example, in our
data, is a judge who chooses not to issue a protective order because the
absence of aﬀordable housing means someone will become homeless.238
Or the judge who chooses to issue a protective order to keep a father from
doing drugs with his daughter because the absence of addiction or mental
health treatment means it is the only alternative.239 There is no law or
procedure in these cases that provides an exception to protective order
requirements when housing is not available. And there is no law or
procedure that allows protective orders to prevent a parent from doing
drugs with their child (in the absence of protective order criteria being
met). Yet in these circumstances, courts are creating or changing law—in
individualized, unwritten ways—to meet litigant needs in the absence of
social provision by other branches of government.
When state civil courts create or change law and procedure, they
confront the range of concerns articulated by Professors Bookman and
Noll in Ad Hoc Procedure.240 In this environment, it is no longer possible to
operate within “rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which
make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the [state] will use its

A domestic violence advocate told us, “I think the way [Centerville] sets up their
process [is] really diﬃcult. When they decided to tie resources to court outcomes it was a
mistake in my opinion.” Interview with Court Actor 3, Centerville.
236. See supra notes 159–160 and accompanying text.
237. The Best and Worst States to Work in America—During COVID-19, OxFam,
https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/countries/united-states/poverty-in-the-us/covidmap/ [https://perma.cc/N7UD-8ZR6] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022).
238. Notes of Hearing 24, Townville ( Judge 2).
239. Notes of Hearing 18, Plainville ( Judge 1).
240. Bookman & Noll, supra note 159, at 829–35.
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coercive powers in given circumstances.”241 This activity by state civil courts
engages questions of legal legitimacy (whether the action by the court is
in fact lawful), sociological legitimacy (whether the action is seen by the
public as appropriate in general), and moral legitimacy (whether the
action is morally justifiable or worthy of respect).242 State civil courts’
creation of law and procedure in the face of the clash between dispute
resolution design and social needs is a direct, repeated expression of a
“desire to address” a problem that the civil justice system provides in
ordinary cases “as opposed to a desire to address systemic concerns.”243
This practice threatens the legitimacy that is traditionally part of civil
procedure and thus civil litigation. Yet at the same time it is necessary in
the context of state civil courts because—in the absence of ad hoc law and
procedure—these courts’ dysfunction would undermine legitimacy even
more.244 What this leads to in the context of state civil courts is a collective
rather than exceptional phenomenon of ad hoc law and procedure. And
this institutional function renders state civil courts policymakers.
Finally, the starkest version of courts as policymakers is when state civil
courts create new institutions. As the examples above demonstrate, these
new institutions are often the result of the sheer will of a few individuals
trying to meet the deep need for social provision in a particular type of
case.245 As with the other categories of courts as policymakers, this is not
an objectively negative phenomenon. Yet a structural perspective reveals
the problems with it.
First, this institution building is a collection of experiments without
the benefit of experimentalism. There is often neither intention at the
outset nor structure in the implementation that allows learning from these
responses to social needs. But, the institution building continues, relying
at best on the limited available research of prior experiments. As we have
discussed more generally in the context of lawyerless courts, there are
241. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 72 (1944); see also Bookman & Noll,
supra note 159, at 774 (“Designed to address specific problems, ad hoc procedure cannot
rely on the fact that it is crafted behind a veil of ignorance in advance of concrete disputes
as proof of its fairness.”).
242. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787,
1796–1801 (2005) (explaining legitimacy as a moral concept); see also Bookman & Noll,
supra note 159, at 835 (questioning whether ad hoc judging can be legitimate); Tom R.
Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 Ann. Rev. Psych. 375,
376, 379 (2006) (reviewing and summarizing the psychological literature on legitimacy, “a
property that, when it is possessed, leads people to defer voluntarily to decisions, rules, and
social arrangements”).
243. Bookman & Noll, supra note 159, at 784.
244. Id. at 845 (noting that although “ad hoc procedure presents a deep challenge to
the traditional model of civil procedure . . . , ad hoc procedure-making bolsters the civil justice system’s legitimacy by ensuring that procedural problems do not prevent it from
functioning”).
245. See Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate, supra note 121, at 1067–69
(describing Washington, D.C.’s Housing Conditions Court founded by an individual judge).
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growing and valiant eﬀorts underway to deepen our research into these
courts. This institutional experimentation is a particular subset of that
need: We need a systemic approach to experimentation to meet the
systemic needs the experiments attempt to address.246
Second, this experimentation is a reaction by the judicial branch to
the absence of social provision by the executive and legislative branches.
And the absence of a systemic approach means that we are avoiding
important institutional questions about the appropriate role for the
judicial branch. These questions are about separation of powers and
whether judicially created institutions in this role are consistent with our
democratic aims. They also raise questions about courts’ role as
bureaucracies, with the attendant challenges of bureaucratic behavior.247
We are not arguing that courts should stop this activity but rather
asking how courts’ leadership in this institution building could motivate
action by legislators.248 Courts are not designed for social provision, yet
they are attempting to do so with a range of consequences. This may well
be the best alternative in a political environment hostile to social
provision. The assumption that courts are resolving disputes may provide
political cover for social provision that a legislature would not support. At
a minimum, courts are carrying a burden that is not part of their design as
institutions. Courts cannot reasonably be expected to stop their ad hoc
social provision in the face of persistent, serious social needs. Yet we need
to ask whether courts’ activity, and especially de facto policymaking, is
preventing other parts of government from addressing these social needs
head on.
In the end, courts are taking up the mantle of social provision in a
range of ways, and this collective activity is shifting their institutional role.
State civil courts are designed as sites of dispute resolution, yet in the face
246. See Monica Bell, Andrea Taverna, Dhruv Aggarwal & Isra Syed, Laboratories of
Suﬀering: Toward Democratic Welfare Governance, in Holes in the Safety Net: Federalism
and Poverty 40, 63–67 (Ezra Rosser ed., 2019) (“[T]o alleviate suﬀering, policy makers and
scholars must take a holistic view of poor people’s lives to best design welfare policy.”). See
generally Monica Bell, Stephanie Garlock & Alexander Nabavi-Noo, Toward a Demosprudence of Poverty, 69 Duke L.J. 1473 (2020) (surveying the structural and substantive impacts
of the “criminalization of poverty”).
247. See Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 Yale L.J. 1442, 1443
(1983) (noting that “in the context of the judiciary, bureaucratization poses a unique challenge to the legitimacy of governmental power”); Patrick G. Scott & Sanjay K. Pandey, Red
Tape and Public Service Motivation: Findings From a National Survey of Managers in State
Health and Human Services Agencies, 25 Rev. Pub. Pers. Admin. 155, 156 (2005) (observing
that “one particular malady [of government bureaucracy] that remains resistant to reform
eﬀorts is red tape”); Patricia M. Wald, Bureaucracy and the Courts, 92 Yale L.J. 1478, 1483–
85 (1983) (arguing that “judges ought to give more attention to managing the judicial
process”).
248. See Bookman & Noll, supra note 159, at 787 (“Just as the problems presented by a
particular case or type of litigation may prompt a court to develop a new form of procedure,
they may motivate lawmakers to redirect claims to a new tribunal that is designed to work
better than courts.”).

1528

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1471

of social needs they are functioning as legislative and policy bodies in a
way that is neither appropriate to their role as a coequal branch of
government nor grounded in collective, experimental problem solving.
CONCLUSION
“I mean the whole system is completely broken and needs to be fire-bombed.” 249
If the challenges of state civil courts are bigger than particular actors,
we need to ask how we should engage with this new understanding of
courts as democratic institutions. How do we imagine a diﬀerent future
where our democratic values are realized in the institutions of state civil
courts? How do we imagine, where we currently see a social need from one
litigant, a world where that social provision is completely realized such that
the needs of both litigants are ultimately met? These questions flow from
our institutional theory of state civil courts and also require more depth
than we can oﬀer here. We oﬀer, in conclusion, some insights to frame
our own—and we hope others’—imagination of a way forward.
We start with our need for more intellectual and political investment
in identifying, developing, and prioritizing structures that support a
“rightsized” role for state civil courts. There is a movement among scholars
and institutional actors to fix the problems we and others name.250 Any
change that meets these democratic challenges must focus on changing
these structural, institutional dynamics, not just practicing within them.
The current menu of incremental reforms, focused on actors in the
system, may improve people’s lives and suppress immediate conflagrations
in the system. And we also need a more audacious agenda.
Any structural change to state civil courts requires mobilization,
including by actors within state civil courts. This is part of a much larger
set of theoretical questions about such mobilization.251 One component is
249. Interview with Court Actor 4, Plainville.
250. See Tonya L. Brito, Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Jessica K. Steinberg & Lauren Sudeall,
Racial Capitalism in the Civil Courts, 122 Colum. L. Rev. 1243, 1249–52 (2022); Portia Pedro,
A Prelude to a Critical Race Theoretical Account of Civil Procedure, 107 Va. L. Rev. Online
143, 156 (2021) (“While some organizers are calling for police abolition, prison abolition,
or both, there is not a widespread call for abolishing courts. Or at least there is not such a
call yet.”); Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan, Alyx Mark & Anna Carpenter, The
Democratic (Il)legitimacy of Assembly-Line Litigation, 135 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 358, 361
(2022) (“Drawing on an invest/divest framework, we propose that bold reform would focus
on reestablishing the democratic legitimacy of state civil courts by increasing social provision
to defendants economically ravished by assembly-line litigation and also by keeping courts
squarely in the business of resolving two-party adversarial disputes.”).
251. For example, systems of social provision in the United States have been institutionalized in various ways that reinforce inequality in society. See Andrea Louise Campbell, How
Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the American Welfare State 10 (2003)
(arguing that seniors’ welfare state programs have moderated political inequality among
senior citizens but have exacerbated it between diﬀerent age groups); Joe Soss, Unwanted
Claims: The Politics of Participation in the U.S. Welfare System 1–2 (2000) (arguing that
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that lawyers, judges, court clerks, and others who see the daily realities of
state civil courts need to exercise their collective political power.252
Another is that courts need to collaborate with communities to build
political will. This requires a shift in thinking to see that, in many ways,
state civil courts are well positioned to orient themselves more
intentionally toward community needs.253
This mobilization explicitly requires engaging the legislative and
executive branches. This engagement is certainly political: Judges should
be collectively educating and motivating their state legislatures to act.254 It
also requires deep investment in, and vulnerability to, research and data
collection. The thicker our understanding of state civil courts, writ large
and in particular examples, the better courts can make the case for
reshaping themselves as institutions. Another component of this
mobilization is intentional experimentation in how we “rightsize” state
civil courts. This is not experimentation for its own sake but rather for
choosing interventions that take inertia away from the status quo.255 Such
experimentation yields information and iteration that demonstrates more
legitimate, democratic, cost-eﬀective roles for courts. And this in turn
generates political power. As others have pointed out, poverty and
inequality will necessarily require political consensus on some substance,
and experimentation can be a tool to reach those goals.256
the welfare system is a political institution that has the potential to empower or marginalize
its clients). Our concern is with reimagining state civil courts, but this necessarily engages
the motivations of political actors more broadly. See, e.g., Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E.
Lerman, Political Consequences of the Carceral State, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 817, 829–32
(2010).
252. See Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 13, at 133–34 (“Any change must begin
with courts and lawyers refusing to blindly accept the courts as a last resort against the legislative and executive branches’ failures to address inequality.”).
253. Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in
New Governance, 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 565, 592–94 (2007) (“The judicial function ought to
be—and in some important respects already is—able to work collaboratively with other
actors in devising and promoting governance structures which are at once eﬀective and
legitimate in problem-solving.”); Massachusetts Trial Court, Ctr. for Institutional & Soc.
Change,
https://change-center.law.columbia.edu/research-projects/massachusetts-trialcourt [https://perma.cc/3DU5-UA6C] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022).
254. See Carpenter et al., Judges in Lawyerless Courts, supra note 8, at 564 (noting that
“researchers, policymakers, and court leaders can explore questions about how best to
influence and shape the future of judging”).
255. See Mariame Kaba, We Do This ‘Til We Free Us: Abolitionist Organizing and Transforming Justice 127 (2021); Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform,
108 Calif. L. Rev. 1781, 1788 (2020) (“Abolitionist demands speak to the fundamental crises
of our times, challenge our siloed expertise as legal scholars, and invite us to reconsider our
commitments to the status quo.”).
256. See Charles Sabel, Dewey, Democracy, and Democratic Experimentalism, 9
Contemp. Pragmatism 35, 44–45 (2012) (noting that “experimentalist lawmaking and
administration . . . begin[] with agreement at the highest-level jurisdiction . . . on broad
framework goals”); David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 547 (2008) (“[T]he lack of a
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State civil courtrooms have become emergency rooms because
people’s social needs remain unmet. Each day courts around the country
are forced to confront this institutional mismatch in the face of this
broader democratic failure. The time has come to address this institutional
challenge head on. We need to engage in the collective exercise of
reimagining state civil courts as democratic institutions.

meaningful consensus about the substantive goals of antipoverty law prevents coherent evaluation of the results of policy experiments: without an agreed-upon set of goals, we cannot
agree on what ‘works’ to accomplish them.”).
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APPENDIX
Our state level data come from the National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) and are from all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and
Puerto Rico for the years 2012 through 2019.257 The totals reported here
are cases initiated in the calendar year. The data appear in two ways. First,
NCSC collects overall caseload data from states, as reflected in Table 1A.
Second, NCSC collects caseload data by case types, as reflected in Tables
1B and 2.
There is no discernible pattern—either within states or across time—
in how states report categorical data. Sometimes a state does no reporting
in a given year. Sometimes a state never reports a particular case type,
suggesting either that the state does not collect that data or that case type
is not applicable under the state’s law. Finally, there is inherent variation
in how states report case types. For example, states have diﬀerent
thresholds for the value of claims in small claims court, and so the same
exact case in one state would be in the “Small Claims” category and in
another state in the “Seller/Plaintiﬀ” category. Although the purpose of
this study is not to explain why states may or may not have reported data
in a given year, future research could investigate these trends.
We readily acknowledge this inconsistency in state-level reporting
within the study period and know that court leadership and the NCSC are
working to improve reporting. The estimates presented here represent
these data to the best of our ability given the constraints of what is
reported. For each case type in Table 2, we calculate the proportion of
cases that the case type represented in a given year and then average that
proportion across the years in the study period. We also list the average
number of reporting states and range in annual reporting to oﬀer
information about the sensitivity in the results when diﬀerent states report
257. For case reporting methodology and categories, see Ct. Stat.
Project,
State
Court
Guide
to
Statistical
Reporting
3–9
(2020),
https://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0026/23984/state-court-guide-tostatistical-reporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/K45R-QF66]. For the underlying data, see CSP
STAT, Ct. Stat. Project, https://www.courtstatistics.org/court-statistics/interactive-caseloaddata-displays/csp-stat [https://perma.cc/YB3S-VSGT] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022). We’d like
to acknowledge the NCSC staﬀ who contributed to each of the annual reports: Alice K.
Allred, Brandan P. Collins, Kathryn A. Holt, Robert C. LaFountain, Kathryn J. Lewis, Diana
McSpadden, Richard Y. Schauﬄer & Shauna M. Strickland (2012); Alice K. Allred, Kathryn
A. Holt, Robert C. LaFountain, Kathryn J. Lewis, Richard Y. Schauﬄer & Shauna M.
Strickland (2013); Alice K. Allred, Kathryn J. Genthon, Kathryn A. Holt, Robert C.
LaFountain, Richard Y. Schauﬄer & Shauna M. Strickland, (2015); Alice K. Allred, Kathryn
J. Genthon, Kathryn A. Holt, Robert C. LaFountain, Richard Y. Schauﬄer, Shauna M.
Strickland, Olivia H. Underwood, Brittney M. Via & Nicole L. Waters (2016); Natasha C.
Anderson, Kathryn J. Genthon, Robert C. LaFountain, Olivia H. Lyles, Diane Robinson,
Brittney M. Via & Nicole L. Waters (2017); Alice K. Allred, Amanda N. Fisher Boyd, Kathryn
J. Genthon, Sarah A. Gibson, Robert C. “Neil” LaFountain, Diane L. Robinson & Nicole L.
Waters (2018); Kathryn J. Genthon, Sarah A. Gibson, Miriam Hamilton, B. Harris, Diane L.
Robinson & Nicole L. Waters (2019).
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in diﬀerent years—investigating this variation may be another fruitful
avenue for scholars. As perspective, the category level reporting in Tables
1B and 2 capture reporting by states representing a range of 73 to 96% of
the population based on 2019 U.S. Census Bureau data.258
TABLE 1A: INCOMING STATE CASES AS REPORTED BY NCSC259
2012–2019
Total
Civil

118,445,434

2012–2019
Annual
Average
14,805,679

Average # States
Reporting

Domestic Relations

35,896,527

4,487,066

44

Criminal

117,823,758

1,133,669

43

Juvenile

9,069,353

14,727,970

38

Traﬃc

330,980,859

41,372,607

38

44

TABLE 1B: INCOMING STATE CASES BASED ON REVISED CATEGORIES260
2012–2019
Total
Civil Justice Needs Cases

85,762,530

2012–2019
Annual
Average
10,720,316

Criminal (Adult) Cases

44,358,919

5,544,865

17

Juvenile Delinquency Cases

2,348,174

293,522

19

307,927,304

38,490,913

25

Traﬃc Cases

Average # States
Reporting
22

258. See QuickFacts: United States, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts
[https://perma.cc/26AY-G7TY] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022).
259. This table captures all reporting from states that reported total incoming cases
(e.g., “Civil Total”), regardless of whether they reported case types (e.g., “Small Claims”) in
a given year. This table uses the same categories as the NCSC.
260. This table is the sum of all incoming cases that were reported by case type. It uses
the categories developed in Table 2. Because fewer states report by case type than overall
incoming cases, there are fewer cases reported here than in Table 1A.
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TABLE 2: CIVIL JUSTICE NEEDS CASES261
2012–2019
Proportion
of Civil
Incoming
Cases

Personal
Relationships
Total
Dissolution/
Divorce*
Civil Protection
Restraining
Orders*
Probate/
Wills/
Intestate
Mental Health
Probate/
Estate (Other)
Domestic
Relations
(Other)*
Non-Domestic
Relations
Restraining
Order
Guardianship
(Adult)
Conservatorship/
Trusteeship
Guardianship
(Unknown)

Range in States
Reporting
(Range in Annual
Proportion)

Social
Need
Presented

Underlying
Social
Need

Average
# States
Reporting

10.03%

Mixed

Mixed

41

37–44
(8.52%–
11.44%)

6.96%

Mixed

Yes

37

33–40
(6.71%–7.47%)

4.22%

Mixed

Mixed

31

22–36
(2.93%–4.98%)

3.58%

Yes

Yes

38

1.97%

Mixed

Mixed

22

1.38%

Mixed

Mixed

19

12–25
(1.05%–1.57%)

1.10%

Mixed

Mixed

22

14–26
(0.81%–1.25%)

0.56%

Yes

Yes

27

19–36
(0.40%–0.70%)

0.38%

Yes

Yes

28

23–32
(0.17%–0.60%)

0.10%

Yes

Yes

16

9–21
(0.00%–0.19%)

30.28%

31–42
(2.83%–3.97%)
16–28
(1.84%–2.09%)

261. The proportions in this table use the total incoming cases reflected in Table 1B as
their denominator. Case types marked with * are ones NCSC categorizes as “Domestic Relations.” Case types marked with ** are ones NCSC categorizes as “Juvenile.” In addition,
habeas corpus cases are included as “Criminal” and not “Civil” in our categorization.
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Small Claims
Small
Claims262
(Tort,
Contract, and
Property)

18.92%

Children Total

15.45%

Support IVD*

36–40
(16.91%–
21.91%)

Mixed

Mixed

38

6.17%

Yes

Yes

21

Paternity*

2.11%

Mixed

Yes

35

Dependency
Abuse/
Neglect**

1.66%

Yes

Yes

31

Custody*

1.28%

Mixed

Mixed

25

18–30
(1.12%–1.65%)

Status
Oﬀense**

0.90%

Yes

Yes

28

23–32
(0.59%–1.18%)

Dependency
Termination
of Parental
Rights**

0.82%

Yes

Yes

36

28–41
(0.74%–0.88%)

Adoption*

0.73%

Yes

Yes

40

34–43
(0.67%–0.80%)

Support
(Other)*

0.55%

Mixed

Yes

14

7–19
(0.38%–0.80%)

0.45%

Yes

Yes

25

0.34%

Yes

Yes

17

0.31%

Mixed

Yes

9

Visitation*

0.07%

Mixed

Yes

15

Dependency
(No Fault)**

0.05%

Yes

Yes

12

Guardianship
(Juvenile)
Dependency
(Other)**
Support
Private/
Non-IVD*

13–28
(5.46%–7.63%)
25–40
(1.66%–2.87%)
20–36
(1.37%–1.96%)

19–31
(0.28%–0.55%)
10–23
(0.13%–0.80%)
4–13
(0.16%–0.43%)
7–21
(0.06%–0.08%)
4–16
(0.01%–0.07%)

262. See supra notes 99 and 102–107 and accompanying text regarding estimates
of total debt collection matters across “Contract” and “Small Claims” case types.
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14.95%

8.83%

Yes

Yes

20

11–27
(2.69%–
11.96%)

3.65%

Yes

Yes

13

8–17
(1.17%–5.49%)

Mortgage
Foreclosure

2.48%

Yes

Yes

26

16–31
(1.84%–3.41%)

Contract Total

8.15%

5.06%

No

Yes

18

12–23
(4.20%–5.98%)

3.01%

No

No

14

5–19
(0.25%–4.94%)

Buyer
(Plaintiﬀ)

0.09%

No

No

8

3–13
(0.01%–0.31%)

Other Total

8.10%

Civil (Other)

4.54%

No

No

15

Writs

2.70%

No

No

19

0.56%

No

No

32

28–37
(0.43%–0.81%)

0.25%

No

No

31

24–34
(0.17%–0.38%)

0.04%

No

No

19

16–21
(0.01%–0.08%)

Landlord/
Tenant
(Other)

Seller/
Plaintiﬀ (Debt
Collection)263
Contract
(Other)

Appeal From
Administrative
Agency
Appeal From
Limited
Jurisdiction
Court
Civil Appeals
(Other)

8–19
(2.76%–6.22%)
12–23
(1.41%–4.47%)

263. See supra notes 99 and 102–107 and accompanying text regarding estimates
of total debt collection matters across “Contract” and “Small Claims” case types.
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Tort Total

2.25%

Automobile
Tort

1.57%

Mixed

Mixed

20

Tort (Other)

0.25%

No

No

14

Premises
Liability

0.15%

No

No

13

Intentional
Tort

0.11%

No

No

15

7–21
(0.08%–0.13%)

Malpractice
(Medical)

0.07%

Yes

Yes

20

9–28
(0.05%–0.09%)

Product
Liability

0.06%

No

No

19

11–27
(0.03%–0.11%)

Malpractice
(Other)

0.02%

Yes

Yes

16

9–12
(0.02%–0.03%)

Slander/Libel/
Defamation

0.01%

No

No

12

4–18
(0.01%–0.02%)

Fraud

0.01%

Mixed

Mixed

9

4–13
(0.00%–0.01%)

1.33%

No

No

17

12–20
(0.72%–1.64%)

0.43%

No

No

21

15–27
(0.29%–0.51%)

0.05%

No

Yes

25

20–28
(0.04%–0.06%)

10–27
(1.15%–1.96%)
6–19
(0.10%–0.32%)
5–18
(0.11%–0.19%)

Tax
Tax

Property NonHousing Total
Real Property
(Other)
Eminent
Domain

0.48%
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Total
Employment
(Other)
Employment
Discrimination
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Total
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Total
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0.09%
0.06%

Mixed

Yes

11

5–17
(0.02%–0.11%)

0.03%

Mixed

Yes

14

7–20
(0.03%–0.03%)

31% (presented)–46% (presented/underlying)

90% (presented)–95% (presented/underlying)

TABLE 3: FEDERAL CIVIL CASES264

Contract, Total
Real Property, Total
Tort Actions, Total
Actions Under Statutes, Total
Prisoner Petitions
Civil Rights
Labor Laws
Intellectual Property
Social Security
Consumer Credit
Other Statutes
TOTAL

2012–2019
Total
211,118
70,331
544,183
1,445,036
465,573
309,606
145,201
100,187
149,645
78,756
196,068
2,270,668

2012–2019
Annual Average
26,390
8,791
68,023
180,630
58,197
38,701
18,150
12,523
18,706
9,845
24,509
283,834

2012–2019
Proportion
9.30%
3.10%
23.97%
63.64%
20.50%
13.64%
6.39%
4.41%
6.59%
3.47%
8.63%
100%

264. This data is drawn from the federal judiciary’s annual reporting. Statistical Tables
for the Federal Judiciary, U.S. Cts., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysisreports/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary [https://perma.cc/C78N-T72T] (last visited Feb.
10, 2022).
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